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A central lesson of the global financial crisis is that banks are not the only
financial firms that can endanger the broader financial system. The Dodd-Frank
Act responded to this reality by empowering a council of financial regulators to des-
ignate individual nonbank financial institutions as systemically risky. Although the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has exercised this authority only four
times, it has occasioned controversy in court, in Congress, and among commenta-
tors. And with Donald Trump's 2016 presidential victory, FSOC's designation au-
thority is now in danger of being radically altered or terminated completely. This
Article defends the FSOC designation scheme, arguing that its critics misunder-
stand the mechanisms by which it helps to reduce systemic risk outside the banking
sector. FSOC designation does not, and cannot, precisely identify firms that could
pose a systemic risk to the financial system. FSOC's broad discretion to impose costly
sanctions on designated firms instead advances two quite different goals. First, it
deters nonbank firms from seeking out systemically risky strategies or activities. Sec-
ond, it holds financial regulators to account by threatening to intrude on their reg-
ulatory turf if they fail to address systemic risk on their own. We term this approach
"regulation by threat"and suggest that it is appropriate when risks are hard to iden-
tify, the perils of mistake are great, and the downsides of misdiagnosis extreme.
Moreover, we argue that the council's discretion is better cabined by its structure-
which features diverse membership, voting, review, and political safeguards-than
by insistence on "hard look"judicial review or a cost-benefit requirement for individ-
ual designation decisions. The council offers a useful alternative mechanism to
standard approaches to regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The global financial crisis was much more than a disaster for
banks. In fact, some of the worst parts of the crisis-the surpris-
ing collapse of the country's largest insurance company on the
same day that one of its oldest money market funds collapsed, and
one day after two of its largest investment banks fell, for exam-
ple-did not involve banks at all.'
1 On September 15, 2008, two investment banks were closed-Merrill Lynch was
sold at a cut-rate price, and Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. See generally Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold (NY Times, Sept 14, 2008), archived
at http://perma.cc/7HUB-4UYA. One day later, the insurance giant AIG accepted an $85
billion bailout that gave the federal government a 79.9 percent stake in the company, and
the Reserve Primary Fund, a large and trendsetting money market fund, "broke[] the
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The government responded to this nonbank problem by cre-
ating the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC, or the
"council")-a panel of the nation's most prominent financial reg-
ulators with the power to designate particular financial firms as
systemically significant. Designated firms are subject to vari-
ous specific anti-insolvency rules-including minimum capital
and liquidity requirements-and supervision by the Federal
Reserve (the "Fed").2
This power of the council, although it has been utilized only
four times, has occasioned considerable controversy in court, in
Congress, and among commentators.3 The chair of the Senate
Banking Committee has wondered whether the council's designa-
tion decisions are "sufficiently open, objective, data driven, and
free from the influence of outside organizations."4 The Republican
Party's presidential platforms in both 2012 and 2016 have com-
mitted the party to revoking the council's powers.5 One court has
buck." See In re The Reserve Fund Securities and Derivative Litigation, 673 F Supp 2d 182,
198 (SDNY 2009). For a discussion, see generally Jill E. Fisch, The Broken Buck Stops
Here: Embracing Sponsor Support in Money Market Fund Reform, 93 NC L Rev 935 (2015).
At the close of the second day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had fallen 800 points
since the start of the week. Brenna Maloney and Todd Lindeman, Five Days That Trans-
formed Wall Street: Sept. 15-19, 2008 (Wash Post, Sept 20, 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/E3UJ-GQUZ. See also Jerome L. Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control and
the U.S. Financial Debt Crisis 111 (Springer 2012) (suggesting that the government's de-
cision to rescue the insurance company, AIG, was driven in part by the collapse of the
money market fund, Reserve Primary).
2 12 USC § 5323(a)(1) (providing that FSOC "may determine that a US nonbank
financial company shall be supervised by the Board of Governors and shall be subject to
prudential standards").
3 See, for example, Peter J. Wallison, The Latest Twist in a Regulatory Sham (Wall
St J, Sept 10, 2014), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/peter-j-wallison-the-latest
-twist-in-a-regulatory-sham-1410389724 (visited May 17, 2017) (Perma archive unavaila-
ble) ("Jeb Hensarling (R., Texas) has also called on FSOC to 'cease and desist' further
designations .... The House backed Mr. Hensarling in July by passing an appropriations-
bill amendment that imposed a one-year moratorium on SIFI designations.").
4 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Shelby Statement
at Hearing on FSOC Accountability (Mar 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/KX4W
-N6QH.
5 See Republican Platform: Restoring the American Dream (GOP, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/GE6E-6U49 (calling for the repeal of the "regulatory nightmare" of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and replacement with "legislation to ensure that the
problems of any financial institution can be resolved through the Bankruptcy Code"); 2012
Republican Party Platform: We Believe in America (American Presidency Project, Aug 27,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2YTB-TJMX ("A Republican Congress and President
will repeal the [Dodd-Frank Act] . . . .").
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reversed the council's designation of the country's largest life in-
surer as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of its authority.6 And
many commentators speculate that President Donald Trump may
formally or informally terminate or radically alter FSOC's desig-
nation process. 7 Indeed, an executive order has already been
promulgated that changes the focus of the council,8 and the first
comprehensive postelection reform proposal to the Dodd-Frank
Acts-the Financial CHOICE Act-would completely eliminate
FSOC's designation power. 10
These critics typically assume that the core purpose of FSOC
designation is to accurately and consistently identify nonbank fi-
nancial firms whose collapse would threaten the financial sys-
tem.1 ' They often imply that FSOC can accomplish this only by
developing a detailed and analytically complete account of what
factors render a nonbank financial firm systemically suspect,
complete with a quantified and comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis conducted in the course of any particular designation.12
The council's designation decisions look less like the critics'
preferred sort of precise determination and more like an infer-
ence, based on a range of factors and evidence, that material fi-
nancial distress at targeted firms "could" contribute to broader
financial instability. This approach, they suggest, could plausibly
permit "any nonbank financial company [to] meet the standard of
6 See Metlife, Inc v Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F Supp 3d 219, 241
(DDC 2016) (applying a controversial cost-benefit requirement to reverse the designation),
citing Michigan v Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S Ct 2699, 2707 (2015).
7 See, for example, Ryan Tracy, How a Financial Council Republicans Loathe Could
Work in Their Favor (Wall St J, Jan 17, 2017), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
how-a-financial-council-republicans-loath-could-work-in-their-favor-148458 1 3 6 8 (visited
Aug 21, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (discussing how to "maintain FSOC's author-
ity-and use it for different aims").
8 See Executive Order 13772 § 2 (2017), 82 Fed Reg 9965, 9965 ("The Secretary of
the Treasury shall consult with the heads of the member agencies of the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council and shall report to the President" on a broad array of policy goals,
including "advanc[ing] American interests in international financial regulatory negotia-
tions and meetings" and "foster[ing] economic growth and vibrant financial markets
through more rigorous regulatory impact analysis that addresses systemic risk and mar-
ket failures, such as moral hazard and information asymmetry.").
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203,
124 Stat 1376 (2010).
10 See generally House Financial Services Committee, The Financial CHOICE Act:
Executive Summary (Feb 28, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8QGA-KLY4.
11 See, for example, Republican Staff of the House Financial Services Committee,
The Arbitrary and Inconsistent FSOC Nonbank Designation Process *4 (2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/S8PN-KNZE.
12 See Metlife, 177 F Supp 3d at 239-40 (requiring the council to conduct a quantified
cost-benefit analysis of designation before designating any particular firm).
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a threat."13 FSOC applies its broad-ranging and flexibly defined
authority, critics conclude, to arbitrarily and inconsistently des-
ignate a subset of disfavored firms.14
We defend the way the council regulates in this Article. The
council was created not to adjudicate between safe and risky busi-
nesses as a court might, or to create a mathematical formula that
firms can apply to their balance sheets to see if they are risky.
Instead, it was created to encourage all financial firms to avoid
taking excessive risks.15 It has chosen to do this by taking action
against some, and in so doing, warning the rest. The threat of
FSOC designation-and the regime of enhanced regulatory re-
quirements and supervision by the Fed that comes along with it--
is meant to deter nonbank financial firms from seeking out risk.
It is also designed to hold nonbanks' primary financial regulators
to account. When firms that they oversee face insufficient sys-
temic risk regulation, FSOC threatens to intrude on their regula-
tory turf.
We call this scheme "regulation by threat." Regulation by
threat requires that a regulator will have the broad discretion to
impose costly sanctions on those they regulate; done well, it will
be a power the regulator wields rarely. The use of regulatory
threats can, in the right circumstances and with the right con-
straints, induce caution in an industry inclined to risky behavior
that is difficult to police.
The council's regulatory powers fit this scheme well. It is ca-
pable of making effective threats that have a real deterrent effect
precisely because of the discretion that it enjoys in applying a
malleable standard to identify systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs). Nonbank financial firms facing a risk of be-
ing deemed systemically significant by FSOC will tend to avoid
embracing strategies that could create systemic risks because
designation comes along with costly regulatory restrictions and
supervision. By contrast, nonbanks that know that the council
will not designate them if they abide by pre-specified rules might
13 FSOC Nonbank Designation Process at *5 (cited in note 11).
14 Id at *3.
15 See Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), archived at
http://perma.cc/V4VE-T2GK ("The Council is charged with identifying risks to the finan-
cial stability of the United States; promoting market discipline; and responding to emerg-
ing risks to the stability of the United States' financial system.").
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take on risk to increase their odds of outsized gains, with, poten-
tially, the promise of a bailout if things go wrong and the at-
tendant low cost of capital that accompanies this prospect.
Regulation by threat works only if designation is costly.16 The
evidence so far suggests that the council's threats are working:
both industry and regulators have changed their conduct to avoid
costly council oversight. FSOC recently rescinded its designation
of GE Capital as systemically significant after the firm sold off its
operations related to short-term debt markets, which were a focus
of FSOC's initial designation decision.17 And investors or manage-
ment in two of the three other designated firms-American
International Group (AIG) and MetLife-have urged their firms
to pursue a similar strategy, an invitation that AIG accepted.18
After, among other things, exiting business in ways that made
that company less interconnected with the rest of the financial
system and reducing "the amounts of its total debt outstanding,
short-term debt, derivatives, securities lending, repurchase
agreements, and total assets, in some cases significantly," as
FSOC put it, it also won de-designation.19 Indeed, the entire in-
surance industry has taken steps to lessen the prospect of desig-
nation by the council, a process that already appears to be bearing
fruit with AIG.20 Moreover, regulators have worried about losing
turf to the Fed-the threat they face if they fail to properly super-
vise risky nonbanks. Here too, recent evidence-including a series
of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rulemakings
geared toward financial stability in the money markets and
emerging reforms in state insurance regulation-is illustrative.21
All of this can be characterized as standards-based regula-
tion, in which the requirements for designation of nonbanks are
16 See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 Harv L Rev
961, 1226 (2001) (observing that law enforcement often pursues "the reduction in the com-
mission of harmful acts through the threat of sanctions").
17 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Basis for the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council's Rescission of Its Determination regarding GE Capital Global Holdings,
LLC *9-10 (June 28, 2016), archived at http://perma.c/NWD8-3MYK.
18 See text accompanying notes 210, 217.
19 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Notice and Explanation of the Basis for
the Financial Stability Oversight Council's Rescission of Its Determination regarding
American International Group, Inc. (AIG) *6 (Sept 29, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/F6F2-SCXH.
20 See Part III.A.
21 See note 246 and accompanying text.
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kept broad and subject to interpretation.22 But FSOC's regime of
regulation by threat is not just an example of regulation by stand-
ard. It is, as a matter of law, unique. We do not ordinarily associ-
ate the broad discretion to administer intensive oversight, some-
times on recipients surprised to be subjected to the treatment,
with good government. As a first approximation, that power to
surprise and penalize sounds like arbitrariness. Moreover, schol-
ars have grumbled that permitting regulators to use threats of
enforcement reduces their incentives to regulate through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, which in turn permits them to evade
judicial review.23 This risk has led even scholars willing to live
with threat-based regulation, such as Professor Tim Wu, to con-
clude that it is only "under certain circumstances[] a superior
means of regulatory oversight."24
We conclude that the judicious deployment of regulation by
threat is both appropriate and necessary in the context of regu-
lating systemic risk outside of the banking sector.25 Threats, de-
terrence, and the strict supervision of some are appropriate when
the risks are hard to identify, the perils of mistake are great, and
the downsides of misdiagnosis are extreme. These are character-
istics of a mission to prevent financial crises outside of the bank-
ing sector, and they exist regardless of the technological fer-
ment. 26 The use of enforcement threats also can be an efficient use
22 The dynamics of standards-based regulation have produced a voluminous litera-
ture across the firmament of legal disciplines. See, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The
Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin L Rev
807, 819-26 (2002) (looking at rules- and standards-based approaches to judicial review of
agency action); Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 Colum L Rev 165,
208-09 (2015) (outlining the rules-and-standards debate and highlighting some of the
leading scholarly participants in it).
23 See, for example, Jerry Brito, "Agency Threats" and the Rule of Law: An Offer You
Can't Refuse, 37 Harv J L & Pub Pol 553, 562 n 47, 564-65 (2014); Philip Hamburger, Is
Administrative Law Unlawful? 260-61 (Chicago 2014) (worrying about the breadth of
agency enforcement powers). See also Appalachian Power Co v Environmental Protection
Agency, 208 F3d 1015, 1020 (DC Cir 2000) (describing how agencies evade judicial review
by refusing to issue narrowing regulations and thereby retaining discretion to act as they
choose in particular cases).
24 Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 Duke L J 1841, 1848 (2011). "Threat regimes ... are
best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change-under conditions of high
uncertainty." Id at 1842.
25 We also tie the threat to final agency action, reviewable by a court-the designa-
tion of a nonbank financial institution as systemically significant-unlike Wu, who would
apply it to "warning letters, official speeches, interpretations, and private meetings with
regulated parties." Id at 1844.
26 See, for example, Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Mar-
kets, 87 Wash U L Rev 211, 223-27 (2009) (noting the immense downside of financial cri-
ses); Hilary J. Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 Loyola U
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of regulatory resources. The council has quite rigorously overseen
a substantial segment of the financial system by selecting four
firms for particular attention.27
More generally, regulation by threat might be one effective
way to regulate when a precautionary principle is appropriate,
the threat of regulation can deter risky behavior, and precisely
defining risky behavior ex ante is impossible.28 As Professor Cass
Sunstein has explained, two tests for evaluating when regulators
should take a "better safe than sorry" approach are (1) when "reg-
ulators lack information about the likelihood and magnitude of a
risk," and so "buy an 'option' to protect against irreversible harm
until future knowledge emerges"; and (2) when "risks have ex-
tremely bad worst-case scenarios."29 These criteria do not just ap-
ply to nonbank systemic risk regulation. Many scholars have
called for more oversight of enforcement decisions at agencies
ranging from the Department of Justice to the SEC.30 They worry
that regulators choose enforcement because they do not have to
justify any particular prosecution through the hurdles of
Administrative Procedure Acts' (APA) rulemaking procedure.32
Regulators can and should act through notice and comment when
doing so is likely to effectively defuse the underlying risks.33 But
Chi L J 173, 195-97 (2013) (arguing for the use of the precautionary principle in financial
regulation).
27 Designations (FSOC, Jan 31, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2FFB-UV9F (not-
ing the designation of AIG, General Electric Capital Cooperation, Prudential Financial,
and MetLife as firms for particular attention).
28 See Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 109-28
(Cambridge 2005). The precautionary principle originated in continental legal systems
and appears in the Treaty of the European Communities (EC) in Article 174. Jan Bohanes,
Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the Precautionary Principle,
40 Colum J Transnatl L 323, 331 n 24 (2002).
29 Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L Rev 841, 845-
46 (2006).
30 Some scholars have worried that the breadth of enforcement discretion in ad-
ministrative law is worryingly uncabined. See, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Oversee-
ing Agency Enforcement, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 1129, 1137 (2016) ("Throughout the federal
system, agencies often use enforcement and adjudication (as opposed to rulemaking) to
set norms, and there is reason to worry that agencies may misuse their discretion.").
Others have argued that aspects of agencies like the SEC in civil enforcement actions
also ought to be subject to more procedural constraints. See, for example, David Zaring,
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 Tex L Rev 1155, 1158-59 (2016) (listing critics
and observing that "agencies have always enjoyed unfettered discretion to choose their
enforcement targets").
31 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5.
32 See Barkow, 84 Geo Wash L Rev at 1160 (cited in note 30).
33 See National Petroleum Refiners Association v Federal Trade Commission, 482
F2d 672, 681 (DC Cir 1973) ("[C]ourts are recognizing that use of rule-making to make
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when it is difficult to tell in advance what conduct will create
risks, regulators must be permitted to regulate through enforce-
ment and example-making; it is a form of regulation that has a
venerable pedigree in, for example, policing tax evasion and anti-
trust violations.34 In financial regulation itself, the designation of
financial institutions as complicit in the financing of terrorism or
the activities of enemy states involves a similar designation pro-
cess and a similar sort of example-making.35
The broader implications of regulation by threat, however, do
not distract us from a second aspect of the central question this
Article answers-whether the council's designation process is le-
gal. That aspect requires a consideration of the checks on the
council's power, given that some of the conventional constraints
of administrative law-reducing discretion through ex ante rule-
making and requiring a cost-benefit analysis-are inappropriate
for the council's mission.
We argue that the council's discretion is better cabined by its
structure than by insistence on particularly "hard look" judicial
review or cost-benefit analysis for any individual designation de-
cision.36 Although the council's procedures look like a rather un-
orthodox form of administrative law, they feature voting, review,
and political safeguards, all of which support the case for the le-
gitimacy of the way the council does designations.37
First, and perhaps most importantly, FSOC is a council, not
an agency, and designation requires a series of affirmative votes
by supermajorities of the council's membership. This membership
incorporates a number of diverse viewpoints and, unlike other in-
teragency committees, uniquely includes voices of state regula-
tors in its mix. As a council with no independent regulatory turf
of its own, it is immune from the regulatory temptation to grow
its own programs. 38
innovations in agency policy may actually be fairer to regulated parties than total reliance
on case-by-case adjudication.").
34 See notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
35 See David Zaring and Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 Iowa L
Rev 1359, 1397-99 (2007) (describing the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control designation process).
36 But see Metlife, 177 F Supp 3d at 241 (reversing the council's designation of
MetLife on "hard look" review and requiring the council to conduct a cost-benefit analysis).
Obviously, we disagree with the court's analysis.
37 About FSOC (FSOC, Feb 27, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/VY37-X2HU.
38 See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Profes-
sional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 Geo Wash L Rev 1105, 1119 (1993) (describ-
ing the turf-building problem).
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Second, although FSOC's substantive standard for designat-
ing nonbanks as systemically important is indeed flexible, it was
itself adopted through a process of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing and, partially as a result, includes a number of guideposts and
safe harbors that limit FSOC's discretion. For instance, FSOC's
final rule on designation both identifies the factors on which the
council will focus in making designation determinations and pre-
sumptively excludes from designation firms with less than $50
billion in total consolidated assets. These standards limit or elim-
inate the threat of designation for the vast majority of nonbanks.
Third, the parallel processes of SIFI designation by interna-
tional organizations like the Financial Stability Board (FSB) pro-
vide an underappreciated check on FSOC's exercise of its power. 39
Increasingly, financial regulators have made themselves, with
congressional approval and the president's support, part of an in-
ternational web of regulation, meant to respond to the fact that
capital easily crosses borders, and that these days financial insti-
tutions do as well.40 FSOC is not the only institution in this global
environment that designates financial institution as systemically
risky; this also limits its discretion.4'
Our analysis not only offers the benefit of making sense of the
unorthodox regulatory remit of a powerful, new federal entity. It
also answers many of the specific challenges to designation lev-
eled by FSOC's critics and helps resolve policy questions that
have arisen as FSOC has done its business. For instance, it sug-
gests that FSOC should retain its relatively unfettered hand to
designate nonbank financial institutions if it is to fulfill its pur-
pose. This requires rejecting calls from critics to require FSOC to
engage in more detailed cost-benefit analysis, a requirement that
risks imposing an impossible burden on the council and thus neu-
tering its capacity to deter the aggregation of systemic risk.
None of this is to suggest that FSOC's designation process is
beyond reproach, and we could see it usefully being reformed in
ways that would remove a degree of potential politicization
among its decision-makers and expand the diversity of viewpoints
39 See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 Va
J Intl L 683, 700-01 (2012) (describing how the FSB makes decisions).
40 See Jean Galbraith and David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cor-
nell L Rev 735, 746 (2014) (describing this evolution).
41 See, for example, id at 746, 761-62 (detailing the existence of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions and the FSB in this regulatory space).
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available to it.42 But these improvements would affect the struc-
ture of the council; its processes, we think, are entitled to respect.
More generally, regulation by threat is not held up here as some
sort of regulatory perfection. Instead, such regulation is the best
of the alternatives, when less supervision would lead to industry
risk-taking and more precise regulation would likely be misguided.
In what follows, Part I outlines the persistent, but difficult-
to-detect and ever-changing, tendency of nonbank financial firms
to take on systemic risk. In Part II, we describe FSOC's designa-
tion process and the inherent difficulties associated with any
judgments about which firms could and could not prove systemi-
cally significant in the midst of a future crisis. In Part III, we ex-
plain how FSOC's designation process operates as a dual threat
against individual nonbank firms that might seek out systemic
risk and their primary regulators who might allow this to occur
on their watch. Finally, Part IV suggests that regulation by
threat is a legitimate approach to regulating systemic risk more
generally, as well as in the council's case.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM: NONBANK SYSTEMIC RISK IN
THE POST-2008 LANDSCAPE
Financial regulation classically divided financial institutions
into three categories: banks, insurers, and securities firms.
Within this tripartite framework, only banking regulation was se-
riously concerned about financial stability.43 By contrast, both se-
curities and insurance regulation focused on goals like protecting
investors and policyholders, and promoting robust capital and in-
surance markets.4 Although fissures in this conventional frame-
work emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s, the financial crisis
shattered the notion that nonbank firms do not pose systemic
risks. Part L.A explains how this came to be, describing the wide
range of nonbank financial firms that played central roles in the
crisis, including investment banks, mutual funds, and insurance-
oriented financial conglomerates. Recapitulating these problems
both provides a factual basis for understanding why Congress
42 See Part IV.
43 The relationship between systemic risk and banking regulation has been appre-
ciated for well over a century. See, for example, Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A De-
scription of the Money Market 298-300 (C. Kegan Paul & Co 7th ed 1878).
44 See generally Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Se-
curities Regulation, 55 Duke L J 711 (2006).
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gave the council a mandate to take on systemic risk in the non-
bank sector and suggests how difficult it is to predict where risk
in that sector will originate.
Part I.B then shows how the migration of systemic risk to
nonbank institutions was largely a product of individual firms ac-
tively seeking to exploit the pre-crisis fragmented regulatory
scheme. Even more importantly, Part I.B explains how policy-
makers' management of the financial crisis increased nonbank
firms' incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage that can pro-
duce systemic risk, at least in the absence of regulatory reforms
like those contained in Dodd-Frank (discussion of which is post-
poned until Part II). By confirming that government actors will
rescue nonbank firms whose failures could have significant spill-
over effects on the broader financial system, the 2008 bailouts in-
creased the incentives facing nonbank firms to seek out systemic
risk in order to decrease their cost of capital.
A. Systemic Risk, Nonbank Financial Firms, and the Financial
Crisis
Prior to 2008, financial regulation was largely premised on
the assumption that banks are fundamentally different from
other types of financial institutions.45 According to this narrative,
banks play a central role in the economy but are also uniquely
susceptible to the risk of failure because depositors can withdraw
funds on demand, creating the prospect of self-reinforcing bank
runs.46 By contrast, nonbank financial institutions-such as in-
surance companies, investment banks, and pooled-investment
companies like hedge funds and mutual funds-were convention-
ally thought to pose only limited risks to the broader financial
system or macroeconomy. 47 Perhaps most fundamentally, this
45 See, for example, E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? (Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis, Jan 1982), archived at http://perma.cc/8X7L-PH9Y; E. Gerald Corrigan,
Are Banks Special? A Revisitation *1 (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Mar 1,
2000), archived at http://perma.cc/4JQS-2G4J; Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield,
and Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va
L Rev 301, 306-07 (1987). For a recent historical account of how banks came to be sep-
arated from other types of financial institutions in the Glass-Steagall Act, see generally
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr, Prelude to Glass-Steagall: Abusive Securities Practices by Na-
tional City Bank and Chase National Bank during the "Roaring Twenties", 90 Tulane L
Rev 1285 (2016).
46 See Richard Scott Carnell, Geoffrey P. Miller, and Jonathan R. Macey, The Law of
Financial Institutions 49-60 (Aspen 5th ed 2013).
47 See Christina Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105
Georgetown L J 1379, 1388-89 (2017).
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was because none of these institutions funded themselves with
demand deposits.48
This conventional distinction between banks and nonbank fi-
nancial institutions undergirded the pre-2008 regime of financial
regulation. Banks, of course, were heavily regulated because of
their fundamental role in the financial system and broader mac-
roeconomy. But the regulation of nonbank financial entities was
predominantly focused on concerns other than financial stability,
such as protecting consumers or investors, or promoting capital
formation or robust insurance markets.49
Although strains in this narrative started emerging in at
least the 1990s,50 it was not until after the financial crisis-the
most significant financial crisis in nearly a century-that it be-
came obvious that nonbank financial firms could indeed pose
large systemic risks. Many of the most important institutions to
fail or be bailed out in the financial crisis-including Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, the Reserve Primary Fund, and
Fannie Mae-were not commercial banks at all.51 Instead, they
were nonbank financial institutions, such as investment banks,
insurance companies, mutual funds, and government-sponsored
enterprises (GSEs), operating in mortgage markets.52
The nonbank financial firms that were most directly impli-
cated in the financial crisis were the five "bulge bracket" invest-
ment banks, none of which currently exists in its pre-crisis form.53
48 See id at 1387 n 26.
49 See Daniel Schwarcz and Steven L. Schwarez, Regulating Systemic Risk in Insur-
ance, 81 U Chi L Rev 1569, 1579-84 (2014) (describing how insurance regulation was not
traditionally concerned with systemic risk); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling
Risk: Corporations, Wall Street, and the Dilemmas of Investor Protection 140-41 (Oxford
2016) (noting that the SEC has traditionally not focused on regulating for the purpose of
limiting systemic risk).
50 See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, 13 J Econ Persp 189, 192-93 (Spring 1999) (detailing the attrition rate of
hedge funds in response to the collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s).
51 To be sure, a number of commercial banks, such as Wachovia, Washington Mutual,
and IndyMac, did fail during the crisis, and the impact of the crisis on commercial banks
was a first-order concern in the midst of the crisis. See Adam J. Levitin, Book Review, The
Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay,
127 Harv L Rev 1991, 2054-55 (2014).
52 See Skinner, 105 Georgetown L J at 1387-89 & nn 24, 26 (cited in note 47) (noting
that shadow banking played a key role in the crisis and that many of the investment banks
that were part of this system were not regulated like traditional banks).
53 Two of these firms (Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch) were purchased by commer-
cial banks, one (Lehman Brothers) failed, and two (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley)
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These firms contributed to the crisis in at least two ways: by pro-
ducing the mortgage-backed securities that propagated through-
out the broader financial system and by failing or nearly failing
during the midst of the crisis.54 Several common factors caused
the failures or near-failures of these large investment banks.55
First, most of these institutions relied substantially on short-term
borrowing markets, particularly repo markets, to finance their
operations.56 In much the same way that depositors can run on a
traditional bank by pulling their funds, lenders in these markets
effectively "ran" on the large investment banks by collectively re-
fusing to roll over their short-term debt.57 Second, all of these in-
vestment banks operated with extraordinarily high amounts of
leverage.58 As a result, they faced enhanced incentives to seek out
risk and a decreased capacity to absorb losses.59 Third, each of
these institutions was substantially invested in securitized bonds
that were ultimately linked to the health of the US real estate
market.60
More surprising than the troubles these five investment
megabanks faced during the crisis were the evident systemic im-
plications of these firms' potential failures. This proposition was
put to the test but once, when federal actors allowed Lehman
Brothers to fail rather than bailing out the firm. This precipitated
unanticipated panic throughout the financial system and is often
viewed as the most dramatic accelerant of panic during the entire
converted to bank holding companies. See Steven M. Davidoff and David Zaring, Regula-
tion by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 Admin L Rev 463,
491-94 (2009).
54 On the former point, see Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall
Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse *11 (Apr 13, 2011)
("Levin-Coburn Report"), archived at http://perma.cc/Z268-KBC3 ("Investment banks
were the driving force behind the structured finance products that provided a steady
stream of funding for lenders originating high risk, poor quality loans and that magnified
risk throughout the U.S. financial system.").
55 See generally Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting
Investment Bank Regulation, 85 Ind L J 777 (2010).
56 See generally Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo, 104 J Fin Econ 425 (2012).
57 See Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort,
116 Colum L Rev 843, 854-55 (2016).
58 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in
the United States *xix (Jan 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/D2CF-SS5W (noting that in
2007, the five major investment banks were operating with "extraordinarily thin capital").
59 See generally Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers'New Clothes: What's
Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It (Princeton 2013).
60 See Gorton and Metrick, 104 J Fin Econ at 430 (cited in note 56).
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crisis period.61 In large part, these investment banks' systemic
significance stemmed from their interconnections with the
broader financial system. For instance, investment banks' pri-
mary counterparties included many of the largest commercial
banks, meaning that their failure could have jeopardized the con-
ventional banking system.6 2 At the same time, the systemic sig-
nificance of the five largest investment banks was also no doubt
related to the inchoate perceptions and fears of individual actors
within the financial markets, a consideration that obviously can-
not be easily explained or quantified.
Many other central players in the crisis were neither com-
mercial banks nor investment banks, but instead entirely differ-
ent types of financial entities. AIG, for instance, was a financial
services holding company that primarily engaged in the business
of insurance.63 The company's near-failure in 2008 was primarily
attributable to two activities at the firm. The first involved the
sale of credit default swaps (CDS)-which essentially "insured"
the risk faced by other major financial institutions that their
mortgage-related securities would default-by the company's
Financial Products division.64 These CDS obligated AIG to post
ever more collateral as payment default on the underlying secu-
rities became more likely and AIG's own financial health became
more precarious. The second cause of AIG's near-failure was the
company's ill-fated securities-lending program, whereby it lent
out the assets of its insurers to a variety of large financial insti-
tutions in exchange for cash collateral, which it then invested in
real estate-backed securities.65 These securities-lending contracts
were very short term, thus allowing spooked counterparties to re-
fuse to roll over the loans and demand a return of their cash col-
lateral. Fatally to AIG, the risks associated with its securities-
lending and CDS programs were highly correlated, resulting in
the company facing crises in these two settings at exactly the
61 See generally Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its
Aftermath (Norton 2015). See also The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *xix (cited in
note 58).
62 See James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk
and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 Fed Reserve Bank St Louis Rev 403, 407-08 (2009).
63 See William K. Sjostrom Jr, The AIG Bailout, 66 Wash & Lee L Rev 943, 945-
46 (2009).
64 See id at 947-51.
65 See Hester Peirce, Securities Lending and the Untold Story in the Collapse of AIG
*18, 27 (Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Working Paper No 14-12, May 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/6M6R-XAVL.
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same time.66 But once again, the most surprising element of AIG's
sudden failure was that it threatened to promote contagion across
the financial system, principally by exposing the company's CDS
and securities-lending counterparties to unknown and unantici-
pated losses.67
Another nonbank that played a central role in the unfolding
of the financial crisis was the Reserve Primary Fund. As with all
money market mutual funds, the Reserve Primary Fund sought
to maintain a stable net asset value of $1 by investing in short-
term low-risk debt and using amortized cost accounting.6 But as
a result of Lehman's failure, the Reserve Primary Fund-which
had invested about 1 percent of its holdings in Lehman's commer-
cial paper-"broke the buck," meaning that it was forced to dis-
close that the value of its assets had fallen below one dollar per
share.69 Investors that had previously perceived these funds to be
absolutely safe panicked, swiftly seeking to redeem their shares.
Reserve Primary's assets plunged more than 60 percent in two
days.70 Over the course of that week, panic spread to other money
market mutual funds, with investors withdrawing over $170 bil-
lion.71 This had real consequences for the broader economy; money
market funds hoarded cash and stopped investing in large US cor-
porations' commercial paper, thus undermining these firms' abil-
ity to finance their working capital at a time when credit on that
scale was largely unavailable.72 The run on money market funds
and cessation of their investments in short-term debt ended only
after the Treasury and Fed announced the Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds.73
66 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the
United States, 5 UC Irvine L Rev 537, 553-54 (2015).
67 See generally Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight, 29 J Econ
Persp 81 (Spring 2015).
68 See William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 Wis L
Rev 1155, 1175.
69 Id at 1161-62.
70 See Davidoff and Zaring, 61 Admin L Rev at 505 (cited in note 53). Evergreen
Investments, a money market fund owned by Wachovia, for example, had to be bailed out
by its parent to avoid breaking the buck. See Daisy Maxey, Sponsors to Back Some Lehman
Exposure (Wall St J, Sept 17, 2008), online at http://www.wsj.coml
articles/SB122161204181845907 (visited Aug 22, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
71 See Diana B. Henriques, Treasury to Guarantee Money Market Funds (NY Times,
Sept 19, 2008), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/
20moneys.html?mcubz=l (visited Aug 22, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
72 See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *31-34 (cited in note 58).
73 See 17 CFR §§ 270, 274.
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Yet another set of nonbanks that played a vital role in the
financial crisis were the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.74 In
the run up to the crisis, these GSEs began purchasing increas-
ingly risky loans and becoming ever more leveraged, following a
similar trajectory to investment banks like Lehman Brothers and
Bear Stearns.75 And like these entities, the GSEs suffered ever-
increasing losses on their portfolio of mortgage-backed securities
throughout late 2007 and 2008, until they experienced their own
liquidity shortfall because of their inability to borrow in the
wholesale funding markets.76 By September 2008, policymakers
were forced to place the GSEs in receivership and inject hundreds
of billions of dollars into them.77 Failing to do so, most agree,
would have substantially exacerbated the crisis: without the
GSEs continuing to promote lending in the housing market, that
market would have further deteriorated, producing losses both for
ordinary homeowners and the rest of the financial sector that had
invested so heavily in real estate-linked securities.78
The list of nonbank financial institutions that were centrally
involved in the financial crisis could continue for some time. It
would undoubtedly include some nonbank mortgage originators,
such as Countrywide Financial, which were responsible for origi-
nating the loans that ultimately formed the basis of the toxic real
estate assets that spread throughout the financial system. 79 It
might well also include entities like the monoline financial guar-
antee insurers, whose troubles quite directly led to the seizing up
of the $330 billion market for auction-rate securities that were
relied on by municipalities, museums, schools, and similar enti-
ties.80 And it would also likely include certain finance companies
like GE Capital, which relied heavily on short-term funding that
evaporated in the crisis and provided an important source of
credit for ordinary consumers and household goods.81 But the
74 See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *19 (cited in note 58).
75 Id at *292, 310.
76 Idat*309-11.
77 See generally Steven Davidoff Solomon and David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie,
Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 BU L Rev 371 (2015) (discussing the col-
lapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Adam B. Badawi and Anthony J. Casey, The Fan-
nie and Freddie Bailouts through the Corporate Lens, 10 NYU J L & Bus 443 (2014).
78 Solomon and Zaring, 95 BU L Rev at 380-84 (cited in note 77).
79 See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless
Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps 149-52 (Oxford 2011) (discussing the role of
nonbank mortgage originators like Countrywide in causing the 2008 crisis).
80 See Schwarcz and Schwarcz, 81 U Chi L Rev at 1586-87 (cited in note 49).
81 See Rescission of GE Determination at *2 (cited in note 17).
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point should now be clear: not only can nonbank financial institu-
tions pose systemic risks to the broader financial system, but they
in fact played a central role in causing the most devastating fi-
nancial crisis in this country since the Great Depression.
B. Market Evolution, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Migration
of Systemic Risk
The traditional notion that systemic risk is confined to the
commercial banking sector worked well enough for about seventy
years. Yet the prominent role of nonbanks in the financial crisis
was no fluke. Instead, it was the result of constant change in the
underlying financial system, with nonbank firms engaging in new
activities, offering new products, and adopting new strategies. In
many cases, these innovations were specifically designed to ex-
ploit unappreciated, or underappreciated, gaps in the tripartite
regulatory regime that presumed systemic risk was relevant only
to bank regulation.82 Part I.B. 1 briefly explains the primacy of
regulatory arbitrage among nonbanks in causing the 2008 crisis.
Part I.B.2 then emphasizes the familiar point that regulators' in-
terventions during the crisis increased the incentives of nonbank
financial firms to seek out systemic risk and thereby benefit from
an implicit government backstop.
1. Market change and regulatory arbitrage in the run-up to
the crisis.
Regulatory arbitrage consists of firms taking advantage of
gaps between the riskiness of a practice and the regulatory treat-
ment of that practice.83 Because regulatory efforts to reduce risk
generally impose costs on firms, such as compliance expenses or
activity restrictions, firms may seek out these regulatory gaps.8 4
Regulatory arbitrage's role in causing systemic risk to mi-
grate to nonbank institutions is easiest to appreciate with respect
82 Of course, regulatory arbitrage is a long-standing dynamic in a broad variety of
financial regulatory settings. See Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation
of Modern Financial Markets, 2 Harv Bus L Rev 235, 256 n 104, 265 (2012). For a treat-
ment of regulatory arbitrage, see generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 Tex
L Rev 227 (2011).
83 See Fleischer, 89 Tex L Rev at 229 (cited in note 82).
84 They may not always do so, of course. Risk-averse firms may prefer to stay within
the confines of risk-reducing regulation. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate
Compliance, 50 BC L Rev 949, 997 (2009) ("[A] risk-averse compliance officer might be
quite happy to implement a highly effective compliance program.").
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to money market mutual funds.85 These funds originated out of a
combination of high inflation in the 1970s and regulatory rules
capping the interest rate that banks could pay on deposits. Money
market mutual funds endeavored to avoid these regulatory re-
strictions while functionally operating like bank accounts. To do
so, they lobbied the SEC to adopt accounting rules that would al-
low them to maintain a net asset value of $1 and to allow share-
holders to write checks on the funds. In exchange, they agreed to
invest in short-term, high-quality, liquid securities, such as com-
mercial paper.86 As described above, the result of these innova-
tions was that investors could and did run en masse from these
funds until the government created an ex post federal guarantee
program analogous to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) insurance.87
The risks posed by the largest investment banks were also a
result of dramatic changes in these firms' business models and
the markets in which they operated. Investment banks were tra-
ditionally relatively conservative institutions, in part because
they were organized as partnerships.88 But as investment banks
shed this status and became publicly owned companies, they in-
creasingly sought out greater sources of risk that could enhance
their bottom line in the short term.89 The evolution of securitiza-
tion and repo markets starting in the mid-1980s helped invest-
ment banks accomplish this objective by allowing them to fund
their operations with large amounts of relatively cheap credit.90
The fact that this credit consisted of short-term loans that credi-
tors could refuse to roll over at a moment's notice was largely
overlooked by securities regulators, who assumed that these
firms' own risk-management incentives were sufficient. Mean-
while, the firms themselves presumed that, in anything but the
most dire circumstances, they could secure alternative financing,
albeit at a higher cost-a straightforward misunderstanding of
the financial environment. And to the extent that they even con-
sidered scenarios when such high-cost financing would not be
85 See Birdthistle, 2010 Wis L Rev at 1157 (cited in note 68).
86 See id. See also 17 CFR §§ 270, 274.
87 See text accompanying note 57.
88 See Claire A. Hill and Richard W. Painter, Better Bankers, Better Banks: Promot-
ing Good Business through Contractual Commitment 95-99 (Chicago 2015).
89 See id at 71-80, 100-07.
90 See Gorton and Metrick, 104 J Fin Econ at 432 (cited in note 56).
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available, they likely assumed either that the government would
assist them or that they would be out of a job in any event.91
AIG's dramatic near-failure was also a product of the com-
pany exploiting regulatory blind spots to seek out short-term
profit.92 For instance, AIG's CDS operations entirely avoided state
insurance regulation because they were conducted from a foreign,
noninsurance entity-AIG Financial Products.93 Meanwhile, even
though AIG's securities-lending operations directly implicated
the securities owned by its insurance companies, AIG avoided se-
rious regulatory scrutiny of these operations by coordinating
them through several noninsurance affiliates of the company. 94
This resulted in no individual insurance regulator taking primary
responsibility for carefully scrutinizing that program or appreci-
ating that AIG Financial Products subjected AIG to risk that was
highly correlated with the firm's CDS activities.95
Although regulatory arbitrage was therefore a key ingredient
in the increase in firms' systemic risk levels leading up to the cri-
sis, plenty of nonbanks appear to have simply misapprehended
the riskiness of what they were doing. For instance, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, with a wealth of experience in housing finance,
were utterly unprepared for the collapse of the mortgage market.
Similarly, Reserve Primary may have been investing in unse-
cured Lehman Brothers debt because it was chasing yield and
loading up on risk, or it may have done so because it failed to un-
derstand how the short-term debt markets worked, or both.
91 See Hill and Painter, Better Bankers, Better Banks at 3-10 (cited in note 88).
92 Although the US Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) technically supervised AIG
Financial Products, the office's pre-crisis regulatory oversight is generally understood to
have been woefully deficient, in part because regulated firms had the option to shop for
the OTS as their regulator. See, for example, The Levin-Coburn Report at *208-39 (cited
in note 54). This was particularly true with respect to nonbanking products, for which the
agency lacked expertise. See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Statement by Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System *13 (Sept 2, 2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/9MSK-K9H2 (noting that the OTS's supervision of AIG's de-
rivatives activities in its financial-products unit "was extremely limited in practice").
93 See Schwarcz and Schwarcz, 81 U Chi L Rev at 1584-87 (cited in note 49).
94 See id; US Government Accountability Office, Financial Crisis: Review of Federal
Reserve System Financial Assistance to American International Group, Inc. *13 (Sept
2011), archived at http://perma.ccW938-TGUY ("Prior to mid-2007, state regulators had
not identified losses in the securities lending program, and the lead life insurance regula-
tor had reviewed the program without major concerns.").
95 See Schwarcz, 5 UC Irvine L Rev at 553 (cited in note 66).
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2. Post-crisis incentives of nonbanks to seek out systemic
risk.
The financial crisis thus demonstrated not only that non-
banks can be systemically risky but also that the precise ways in
which this can occur are constantly shifting as a result of regula-
tory arbitrage and broader market trends. At the same time, pol-
icymakers' willingness to bail out nonbanks in the midst of the
crisis increased the incentives of nonbank financial firms to be-
come systemically risky so as to benefit from this implicit govern-
ment backstop. Throughout the financial crisis, government ac-
tors repeatedly bailed out nonbank financial firms and industries
when they perceived that doing otherwise would cause the crisis
to spread further.96 Although these bailouts remain immensely
unpopular among the general population, a majority of policy-
makers and experts agree that they ultimately helped prevent a
much worse financial crisis that would have plunged the United
States into a much deeper and more sustained recession.97
Holding the applicable regulatory regime constant, these
facts tend to incentivize nonbank financial firms to become sys-
temically significant so that they can enjoy the benefits of an im-
plicit government guarantee. 98 By becoming systemically risky-
or being perceived to be systemically risky by financial markets-
a firm can now, in the post-crisis era, increase the perceived
chances that it will be bailed out if it comes close to failure during
a broader period of financial instability. This, in turn, can de-
crease the costs to that firm of funding its operations, as credi-
tors accept lower rates of return in exchange for a perceived im-
plicit government guarantee that the debtor firm will not be
allowed to fail in a subset of situations. Indeed, numerous stud-
ies demonstrate this effect, documenting that large financial
96 See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 Georgetown L J 435, 437-38
(2011) (recounting the "spectacular parade" of bailouts during the financial crisis from
2007 to 2009).
97 See, for example, Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises
502-05 (Crown 2014); Bernanke, The Courage to Act at 366-67 (cited in note 61).
98 See John C. Coffee Jr, Systemic Risk after Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and
the Need for Regulatory Strategies beyond Oversight, 111 Colum L Rev 795, 800 (2011)
(arguing that some firms specifically sought out risk prior to the crisis so that they would
be considered too big to fail); John C. Coffee Jr, The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why
Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L Rev
1019, 1050 (2012). It is impossible to document this effect in the post-crisis world precisely
because regulation has not been held constant: the Dodd-Frank Act created a host of re-
forms designed to deter individual firms from becoming systemically significant. FSOC's
capacity to designate nonbanks as systemically significant is just one of those reforms.
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firms enjoy lower borrowing costs than implied by their risk be-
cause of investor expectations of government support in tail-end
situations.99
II. DODD-FRANK, FSOC DESIGNATION, AND IDENTIFYING
SYSTEMICALLY RISKY NONBANK FINANCIAL FIRMS
Dodd-Frank adopts several different approaches to respond-
ing to the risk that a nonbank financial firm might become sys-
temically risky. For instance, it establishes new rules for risk-
creating activities that apply regardless of the types of
institutions engaging in those activities.100 It also creates a new
resolution regime for any nonbank financial firm whose failure
would have systemic consequences.1 01 However, Dodd-Frank's
most direct approach to addressing the risks described in Part I
is to empower the council to determine which specific nonbanks
pose a systemic threat.102 Firms that are so designated are subject
to enhanced prudential standards and supervision by the Fed.
Part II.A outlines this designation regime. It describes
FSOC's relatively malleable standard for identifying nonbank
SIFIs, which incorporates a broad range of relevant quantitative
and qualitative factors rather than a precise rule-like definition.
At the same time, this standard provides a presumptive safe har-
bor from designation for the vast majority of nonbank firms that
do not surpass specific, quantitative thresholds.
Using the FSOC regime as a jumping-off point, Part II.B then
explores the key characteristics of nonbank SIFIs, as well as the
residual uncertainty that currently exists about how best to iden-
tify these firms. In doing so, Part II.B emphasizes an inherent dif-
ficulty of FSOC designation: the distinction between nonbank
firms that are systemically significant and those that are not is
99 See, for example, Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer, and A. Joseph Warburton, The
End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees *35
(working paper, May 1, 2016), archived at http://perma.c/74D3-VBX4; US Government
Accountability Office, Large Bank Holding Companies: Expectations of Government Sup-
port *1 (July 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/WEW3-RPSG; Joao Santos, Evidence from
the Bond Market on Banks' "Too-Big-to-Fail" Subsidy, 20 Fed Reserve Bank NY Econ Pol
Rev 29, 33-34 (Dec 2014).
100 See generally Kristin N. Johnson, Clearinghouse Governance: Moving beyond Cos-
metic Reform, 77 Brooklyn L Rev 681 (2012).
101 See David A. Skeel Jr, Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in
Martin Neil Baily and John B. Taylor, eds, Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on
the Financial Crisis 311, 317-19 (Hoover 2014).
102 Hilary J. Allen, Putting the 'Financial Stability" in Financial Stability Oversight
Council, 76 Ohio St L J 1087, 1116-18 (2015).
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inherently murky. Although broad consensus exists on many of
the relevant factors for assessing whether an individual nonbank
firm is systemically significant, it is impossible to predict with
any modicum of certainty how any single firm's financial distress
or range of activities might reverberate throughout the broader
financial system in some hypothetical, future, financially stressed
world.
A. Overview of FSOC's Designation Power
FSOC designation is a product of both Dodd-Frank's statu-
tory text and the council's final rule that implemented these pro-
visions. Part II.A.1 describes the statutory framework, while
Part II.A.2 elaborates on FSOC's implementation. Finally,
Part II.A.3 discusses FSOC's designations to date.
1. Dodd-Frank's designation mechanism.
Dodd-Frank grants FSOC expansive authority to collect and
analyze information relating to systemic risk and to recommend
regulatory or legislative reforms to Congress, federal and state
agencies, and the public more generally.103 For instance, FSOC
enjoys a broad range of data-gathering and data-analysis tools,
the most important of which is its authority to provide direction
to, and request data from, the Office of Financial Research (OFR),
an independent bureau within the Treasury Department.104 Sim-
ilarly, FSOC must annually report and testify to Congress on a
host of issues, including regulatory developments and its recom-
mendations for improving financial stability.105
However, FSOC's primary substantive power is its authority
to designate nonbank financial companies as "systemically im-
portant" (a term widely used in practice that does not, amusingly
enough, appear in the statute itself).106 By contrast, FSOC cannot
103 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 112-20, 124 Stat at 1394-1410, 12 USC §§ 5322-30.
104 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat at 1395-96, 12 USC § 5322(a)(2). The OFR,
in turn, has the authority to require nonbank financial companies to submit data or peri-
odic reports to the office, so long as that data is not available directly from the firm's pri-
mary financial regulator. See Dodd-Frank Act § 112(d)(3), 124 Stat at 1397, 12 USC
§ 5322(d)(3).
105 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat at 1395-96, 12 USC § 5322(a)(2).
106 See Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat at 1398-1402, 12 USC § 5323. See also Stav-
ros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 Cal L Rev 327,
369 (2013). FSOC also has the authority to "identify systemically important financial mar-
ket utilities and payment, clearing, and settlement activities," a power that it has exer-
cised. Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2)(J), 124 Stat at 1395, 12 USC § 5322(a)(2)(J).
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set supervisory priorities for member agencies or develop new or
revised regulations regarding activities or practices that are un-
der their jurisdiction. Instead, FSOC simply has persuasive au-
thority with respect to these key elements of the financial regula-
tory universe. For instance, FSOC can "recommend[ " that
member agencies apply "new or heightened standards and safe-
guards for financial activities or practices that could" generate
systemic risk.107 But member agencies need not accept these rec-
ommendations, so long as they provide an explanation for their
decision.108
Exercising this designation requires an affirmative vote of at
least seven of FSOC's ten voting members, including its chairper-
son, the secretary of the treasury.1 09 When the council exercises
this power, it must explain the basis for its determination to the
firm and the public.110
Firms that are designated as systemically important by the
council are subject to enhanced prudential standards and super-
vision by the Fed.111 Dodd-Frank specifies that these prudential
standards must be "more stringent" than those applicable to firms
that do not present similar risks to financial stability.112 It also
mandates that they include requirements relating to risk-based
capital, liquidity, risk management, resolution planning, single-
counterparty credit limits, and stress tests.113 However, Dodd-
Frank grants the Fed broad discretion to craft these rules based
on the specific risk profiles of designated firms, a fact that Con-
gress clarified in post-Dodd-Frank legislation.114 The Fed has re-
cently started implementing this authority for systemically risky
nonbank firms predominantly engaged in the business of insur-
ance, issuing an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that
107 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2)(K), 124 Stat at 1395, 12 USC § 5322(a)(2)(K).
108 See Dodd-Frank Act § 120(c)(2), 124 Stat at 1409, 12 USC § 5330(c)(2).
109 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC § 5323(a)(1).
110 See Dodd-Frank Act § 113(e)(1), (3), 124 Stat at 1401, 12 USC § 5323(e)(1), (3).
I1 Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 124 Stat at 1423-32, 12 USC § 5365.
112 Dodd-Frank Act § 115(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat at 1403, 12 USC § 5325(a)(1)(A).
113 Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat at 1424, 12 USC § 5365(b)(1)(A). The Fed
is also authorized to adopt a broad range of additional prudential standards, such as con-
tingent-capital and enhanced disclosure requirements. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(B), 124
Stat at 1424, 12 USC § 5365(b)(1)(B).
114 See Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014 § 202, Pub L No 113-
279, 128 Stat 3017, 3018, codified at 12 USC § 5371(c).
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would establish specific capital and liquidity requirements for
these companies.115
This designation process is, in many ways, less intrusive than
the way that systemically significant banks are regulated. Those
institutions, if they have more than $50 billion in assets, are pre-
sumed to be designated, meaning that more banks are subject to
additional supervision by the Fed than are nonbanks, which re-
quire individualized determinations rather than the application
of asset (or other) thresholds.116
Congress constrained FSOC's authority to designate firms as
systemically significant in several ways. First, it required FSOC
to designate firms under one of two standards: FSOC must find
that the firm "could pose a threat to the financial stability of the
United States" either (i) in the event of its "material financial dis-
tress"; or (ii) due to "the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of [its] activities."117 Second, it enu-
merated ten different factors that FSOC shall consider in decid-
ing whether a firm meets one of these two designation stand-
ards.11s Third, it limited designation to firms "predominantly
115 See generally Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Capital Require-
ments for Supervised Institutions Significantly Engaged in Insurance Activities, 81 Fed
Reg 38631 (2016).
116 Dodd-Frank Act § 121, 124 Stat at 1410-11, 12 USC § 5331.
117 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC § 5323(a)(1). In each of its
four designations, FSOC has chosen to focus on the first designation standard, which an-
alyzes on the potential impact of "material financial distress" at the company. Dodd-Frank
Act § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC § 5323(a)(1). In his dissent to the MetLife deci-
sion, Roy Woodall, the independent member with insurance expertise on FSOC, criticized
the council for ignoring the second designation standard. See Financial Stability Oversight
Council, Views of the Council's Independent Member Having Insurance Expertise *1 (Dec
18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/99HP-NUAS.
18 Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 124 Stat at 1398-1402, 12 USC § 5323. The financial ac-
tivities are:
(A) the extent of the leverage of the company; (B) the extent and nature of the
off-balance-sheet exposures of the company; (C) the extent and nature of the
transactions and relationships of the company with other significant nonbank
financial companies and significant bank holding companies; (D) the importance
of the company as a source of credit for households, businesses, and State and
local governments and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial
system; (E) the importance of the company as a source of credit for low-income,
minority, or underserved communities, and the impact that the failure of such
company would have on the availability of credit in such communities; (F) the
extent to which assets are managed rather than owned by the company, and the
extent to which ownership of assets under management is diffuse; (G) the na-
ture, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the activi-
ties of the company; (H) the degree to which the company is already regulated
by 1 or more primary financial regulatory agencies; (I) the amount and nature
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engaged in financial activities,"19 thus exempting the Apples and
Walmarts of the economy from fears of supervision by the Fed.
Additionally, it provided that designated firms are to be subject
to annual reviews to determine whether the designation is still
appropriate.120
2. FSOC's final rule and guidance.
Congress required FSOC to consider a broad range of factors
in deciding which nonbank firms could pose "a threat to the finan-
cial stability of the United States."121 FSOC's final implementing
rule, adopted under standard notice and comment procedures,122
simplified this structure in some ways and elaborated on it in oth-
ers. Perhaps even more importantly, it established a three-stage
process for the council to exercise this authority.
With respect to the substantive standard for designation,
FSOC's final rule and guidance reorganized Dodd-Frank's ten
statutory factors into six broad categories: (1) size; (2) substituta-
bility; (3) interconnectedness; (4) leverage; (5) liquidity risk and
maturity mismatch; and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny.123 The
first three of these categories "seek to assess the potential impact
of the financial assets of the company; [and] (J) the amount and types of the
liabilities of the company, including the degree of reliance on short-term funding.
Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC § 5323(a)(2). The list of considera-
tions concludes with a catchall provision: "any other risk-related factors that the Council
deems appropriate." Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(2)(K), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC
§ 5323(a)(2)(K).
119 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 102(a)(4)(B)(ii), (a)(6), 113, 124 Stat at 1391-92, 1398-1402, 12
USC §§ 5311(a)(4)(B)(ii), (a)(6), 5323. Such firms must derive 85 percent or more of their
consolidated annual gross revenues from financial activities, or have 85 percent or more
of their assets related to activities that are "financial in nature." Dodd-Frank Act
§ 102(a)(6), 124 Stat at 1392, 12 USC § 5311(a)(6).
120 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(d), 124 Stat at 1401, 12 USC § 5323(d).
121 Nonbank Designations-FAQ (FSOC, Feb 4, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/G2KD-8TJR.
122 See id:
Before adopting its rule and interpretive guidance on nonbank financial com-
pany designations, the FSOC voluntarily solicited public comment three times
over an 18-month period. This notice and comment process benefited from input
from companies and trade organizations representing a broad array of financial
sectors, as well as academics and public interest groups.
123 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and Reg-
ulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed Reg 21637, 21658-60 (2012),
amending 12 CFR Part 1310. FSOC's implementing rule further defined a threat to the
financial stability of the United States to exist if "there would be an impairment of finan-
cial intermediation or of financial market functioning that would be sufficiently severe to
inflict significant damage on the broader economy." Id at 21657.
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of the nonbank financial company's financial distress on the
broader economy."124 The second three "seek to assess the vulner-
ability of a nonbank financial company to financial distress,"12 an
inquiry that "shed[s] light on the effects that distress could have
on the company, and on how the company may respond in the
event of material financial distress."126 According to FSOC, its use
of the word "vulnerability" to describe the final three categories
does not require it to conduct an independent assessment of des-
ignated firms' likelihood of failure.127 In addition to these six cat-
egories, FSOC's guidance suggests a seventh relevant factor not
directly contained in Dodd-Frank: the complexity and resolvabil-
ity of the financial institution.128 Above all, the council indicated
it would look to see if the firm would, if it ran into trouble, "inflict
significant damage on the broader economy" by disrupting the fi-
nancial system.1 29
FSOC's final rule also described the ways that a firm's activ-
ities or material financial distress could spread throughout the
financial system, which it describes as three "transmission chan-
nels."130 Under the exposure channel, a firm's creditors, counter-
parties, investors, or other market participants could directly suf-
fer losses due to the firm's losses.131 Second, under the asset
liquidation channel, a nonbank financial company that quickly
liquidated its assets could thereby "disrupt trading or funding in
key markets or cause significant losses or funding problems for
other firms with similar holdings."132 Finally, a firm's activities or
financial distress could reverberate throughout the larger finan-
cial system if that firm supplied a critical function or service to
financial markets. 133
In addition to clarifying the substantive standard for desig-
nation, the council also established a three-stage procedure by
which it planned to implement this standard.134 Stage 1 of that
process operates as a quantitative screening mechanism to
124 Id at 21658.
125 Id.
126 Brief for Appellant, MetLife v Financial Stability Oversight Council, Civil Action
No 16-5086, *29 (DC Cir filed June 16, 2016) (available on Westlaw at 2016 WL 3356866).
127 Id at *28.
128 77 Fed Reg at 21646 (cited in note 123).
129 Id at 21657.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 77 Fed Reg at 21657 (cited in note 123).
133 Id.
134 Id at 21641-47.
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identify, based on publicly available data, an initial set of non-
banks that might be systemically important. For purposes of
Stage 1, FSOC defined the following six "uniform quantitative
thresholds":
(i) $50 billion in total consolidated assets; (ii) $30 billion in
gross notional credit default swaps outstanding for which a
nonbank financial company is the reference entity; (iii) $3.5
billion of derivative liabilities; (iv) $20 billion in total debt
outstanding; (v) 15 to 1 leverage ratio of total consolidated
assets (excluding separate accounts) to total equity; and
(vi) 10 percent short-term debt ratio of total debt outstanding
with a maturity of less than 12 months to total consolidated
assets (excluding separate accounts).135
Generally, FSOC will evaluate nonbanks in Stage 2 only if
they meet both the first threshold (consolidated assets) and one
of the additional five thresholds.136 FSOC justified its selection
and specification of these Stage 1 quantitative thresholds in
terms of their predictive capacity and their practicality.137 In par-
ticular, FSOC noted that these thresholds apply meaningfully to
nonbanks operating in a range of different industries, would have
captured many of the nonbank financial firms that contributed
significantly to systemic instability in the financial crisis, and
could generally be assessed using publicly available infor-
mation.138 Nonetheless, FSOC emphasized that this quantitative
screen is ultimately "an imperfect mechanism to identify all non-
bank financial companies of which further review is war-
ranted."139 For this reason, FSOC reserved the possibility that it
might elevate a nonbank firm for Stage 2 review even if it does
not satisfy this quantitative test.140
Those firms that pass through the Stage 1 quantitative
screen are then subject to a Stage 2 evaluation, during which the
council prioritizes its analysis of them. In doing so, the council
relies on "a wide range of quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation" that it extracts from publicly available and regulatory
sources. 141 Firms that pass the first two stages proceed to Stage 3,
135 Id at 21643 (formatting omitted).
136 77 Fed Reg at 26143 (cited in note 123).
137 Id at 21641.
138 Id at 21643.
139 Id at 21642.
140 77 Fed Reg at 21643 (cited in note 123).
141 Id at 21660.
[84:18131840
Regulation by Threat
at which point they are informed that they are being considered
for FSOC designation and invited to meet with council staff and
submit relevant materials to the council.142 There are, it is worth
noting, some benefits to the informal nature of these meetings, in
which firms can get a sense of the concerns of the council and de-
cide whether to address them in a way that would not be possible
in a more formalized enforcement process.
3. FSOC's designations to date.
Under these procedures, FSOC has to date elevated nine non-
bank financial firms to Stage 2 analysis and advanced either four
or five of these to Stage 3 of the FSOC process.1 43 In total, FSOC
has designated four nonbank financial companies as SIFIs.144
These include the country's three largest insurance-focused finan-
cial conglomerates--AIG,145 Prudential Financial,146 and
MetLife147-and the financing arm of a major industrial corpora-
tion, General Electric Capital Corporation (GE).148
FSOC's designation of MetLife is illustrative of its designa-
tion process; the designation is also the most well documented due
to MetLife's court challenge.149 MetLife was notified in July 2013
that it was under consideration by the council, meaning that the
firm had passed the first two stages of designation.150 Over the
next year, council staff met with MetLife's representatives twelve
times and held five meetings with two state insurance authorities
142 Id at 21645. We describe the Stage 3 procedure in more detail below, in connection
with FSOC's designation of MetLife. See text accompanying notes 149-66.
143 See FSOC Nonbank Designation Process at *25 (cited in note 11).
144 See id.
145 See generally Financial Stability Oversight Council, Basis of the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council's Final Determination regarding American International Group, Inc.
(July 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Q8GW-RK5X.
146 See generally Financial Stability Oversight Council, Basis for the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council's Final Determination regarding Prudential Financial, Inc. (Sept
19, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/GDY6-VAC6.
147 See generally Financial Stability Oversight Council, Basis for the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council's Final Determination regarding MetLife, Inc. (Dec 18, 2014), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/K2V2-MVK4.
148 See generally Financial Stability Oversight Council, Basis of the Financial Stabil-
ity Oversight Council's Final Determination regarding General Electric Capital Corpora-
tion, Inc (July 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/8KK3-D63T.
149 See MetLife, Inc v Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F Supp 3d 219, 229
(DDC 2016).
150 MetLife Designation at *2 (cited in note 147).
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with jurisdiction over MetLife's insurance subsidiaries.151 Addi-
tionally, MetLife submitted over twenty-one thousand pages of
materials to the council.12
The council voted 9-1 to make a proposed designation of
MetLife on September 4, 2014, and thereafter sent the company
a notice and explanation of this determination.18 MetLife then
contested the proposed determination, submitting written mate-
rials explaining its objections and further elaborating on them in
a hearing before the full council on November 3, after which more
written materials were submitted.154 After considering these ma-
terials, the council by a vote of 9-1 officially designated MetLife.155
At that time, the council provided MetLife with a detailed state-
ment of the basis for its decision, including nonpublic information
provided by MetLife to the council.156
FSOC's public basis relied on the first determination stand-
ard, concluding that "material financial distress" at MetLife could
produce financial instability.17 The council focused on the poten-
tial consequences of material financial distress at MetLife "in
the context of a period of overall stress in the financial services
industry and in a weak macroeconomic environment."158 This
vantage point, it explained, is "[c]onsistent with the Council's
mission under the Dodd-Frank Act to identify potential threats
before they occur," given that "financial crises can be hard to
predict and can have consequences that are both far-reaching
and unanticipated."159
Material financial distress, the council determined, could be
transmitted throughout the broader financial system through
both the exposure and asset liquidation transmission channels.160
In reaching this conclusion, FSOC's public basis discusses each of
the ten statutory factors in Dodd-Frank and the six categories
contained in its final rule. For instance, the council emphasized
that MetLife was the largest insurance provider in the US by sev-
eral measures and is "significantly interconnected to insurance
151 Id at *2-3.
152 Id at *3.
153 Id.
154 MetLife Designation at *3 (cited in note 147).
155 MetLife, 177 F Supp 3d at 229.
156 MetLife Designation at *3 (cited in note 147).
157 Id at *3_4.
158 Id at *5.
159 Id.
160 MetLife Designation at *16 (cited in note 147).
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companies and other financial firms through its products and cap-
ital markets activities."161 These activities, including securities
lending and the funding of agreement-backed notes, create liabil-
ities "that increase the potential for asset liquidations by MetLife
in the event of its material financial distress."12 The council also
noted that "MetLife's complexity, intra-firm connections, and po-
tential difficulty to resolve" could aggravate the risk that finan-
cial distress at the company could impair financial market func-
tioning.163 Additionally, while acknowledging that MetLife's
operating insurers are subject to state insurance regulation, the
council noted that this regulation is focused predominantly on
protecting policyholders and does not include key elements of fi-
nancial stability regulation, such as consolidated capital and li-
quidity requirements.164
B. Key Characteristics of Nonbank SIFIs and the Residual
Uncertainty in Identifying These Firms
Notwithstanding the apparent complexity of FSOC's designa-
tion regime, the distinction between nonbank financial firms that
are systemically significant and those that are not is both murky
and indeterminate. To be sure, broad agreement exists regarding
many of the central characteristics of systemically risky nonbank
financial firms. Each of the six categories specified in FSOC's fi-
nal rule and guidance-(1) size; (2) interconnectedness; (3) sub-
stitutability; (4) leverage; (5) liquidity risk and maturity mis-
match; and (6) existing regulatory scrutiny165-are relevant to
this inquiry. Indeed, some subset of these factors helps to explain
each failure of a major nonbank financial firm that helped stoke
the financial crisis. For instance, every one of these factors, other
than substitutability, was arguably implicated in the demise of
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. As discussed in Part I, these
entities were large, highly leveraged companies that relied on
short-term debt and were deeply interconnected with the rest of
the financial system.16  But they were regulated primarily by the
161 Id at *6.
162 Id at *9.
163 Id at *16.
164 MetLife Designation at *26 (cited in note 147).
165 See 77 Fed Reg at 21639 (cited in note 123).
166 See Part I.A.
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SEC, which viewed its mission predominantly in investor protec-
tion rather than financial stability terms.167 The factor of "substi-
tutability" was most obviously exemplified by the GSEs, which
provided essential and irreplaceable support to the real estate
market through their loan guarantees and purchases.168 Of
course, the GSEs were also leveraged to the hilt, relied on short-
term financing, maintained massive balance sheets, and were
subject to inadequate regulatory oversight.169
Additionally, many experts would probably agree that two of
FSOC's six categories-(1) liquidity risk and maturity mismatch
and (2) existing regulatory scrutiny-deserve special emphasis
because they define the basic parameters of "shadow banking."
Shadow banking is best defined as (i) short-term liabilities
(ii) backing potentially illiquid assets (iii) when the traditional re-
strictions and backstops of bank regulation are not present. 170 The
first two factors describe what any bank does, and the third ex-
presses the fact that the shadow bank is not regulated as a bank.
Shadow banking played a particularly important role in the cri-
sis, allowing spooked creditors to "run" on financial institutions
like Lehman, in much the same way that depositors can run on a
bank by withdrawing deposits.171 There is good reason to believe
that such runs-which can generate self-reinforcing and conta-
gious panic-constitute the sine qua non of systemic risk.172
The assessment of any particular firm's systemic signifi-
cance, however, is inherently subject to substantial uncertainty.
167 See Lawrence A. Cunningham and David Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches
to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78
Geo Wash L Rev 39, 59-62 (2009). As described in Part I, the same set of five factors were
instrumental in explaining AIG's systemic implications: AIG was a massive financial con-
glomerate whose CDS portfolio and securities-lending operations resulted in off-balance
sheet leverage, massive interconnections with the rest of the financial system, and sub-
stantial maturity mismatch. Neither state insurance regulators nor the OTS adequately
regulated the company on a consolidated basis by either. See Part I.
168 See Solomon and Zaring, 95 BU L Rev at 378-87 (cited in note 77).
169 See id.
170 See Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System
*269 (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No 2, Oct 18, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/4JCS-8CN6. See also Zoltan Pozsar, et al, Shadow Banking, 19 Fed Re-
serve Bank NY Econ Pol Rev 1, 1-3 (Dec 2013); John Armour, et al, Principles of Financial
Regulation 445-48 (Oxford 2016).
171 See Gorton and Metrick, 104 J Fin Econ at 426-27 (cited in note 56).
172 See Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 165 (Chi-
cago 2016) (observing that a run at one bank may become a focal point for runs at other
banks, exposing the economy to disaster).
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Fundamentally, this is because whether or not a firm is systemi-
cally significant depends on a nearly infinite array of variables
that are impossible to anticipate with anything resembling preci-
sion.173 For instance, the impact of a firm's financial distress on
the broader financial system depends not only on the behavior of
the firm's creditors, counterparties, and regulators, but also-and
to a much larger extent-on these responses' secondary effects on
other actors in the broader financial system. And that, in turn,
would be influenced by these secondary actors' ever-changing
perceptions of the financial system's health, not to mention the
actions of lawmakers and regulators. Accurately anticipating
each of these factors would require one arbitrary assumption af-
ter another.174
Revisiting regulators' understanding of Lehman Brothers
during the financial crisis illustrates this point vividly. Although
regulators had varying views regarding whether Lehman could or
should be bailed out, hardly anyone predicted that allowing the
firm to fail would trigger the sequence of events that followed its
bankruptcy filing.175 Yet Lehman's failure was perhaps the finan-
cial crisis's single most dramatic accelerant, directly causing a se-
ries of unexpected knock-on events, including the freezing of the
commercial-paper market and runs on money market mutual
funds.176 The nation's leading financial regulators, in other words,
could not anticipate the impact of Lehman's failure on the finan-
cial system immediately before it occurred-in spite of their
knowledge of Lehman's balance sheet at that time, as well as the
state of the broader economy and financial system. In light of this
reality, it is simply unrealistic to expect that FSOC or anyone else
could correctly anticipate the precise impact of a firm's financial
distress as a result of hypothetical, future losses incurred under
unknown financial and economic conditions. Because financial
crises are so unpredictable, the margin of error that supervisors
need must be capacious.
173 This point has been emphasized by critics of FSOC. See, for example, The Growth
of Financial Regulation and Its Impact on International Competitiveness, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Financial
Services, 113th Cong, 2d Sess 62 (2014) (statement of Peter J. Wallison, American
Enterprise Institute) ("[It is impossible to know whether a particular institution's 'dis-
tress' would cause instability in the US financial system.").
174 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 Yale L J 882, 997-99 (2015).
175 See Bernanke, The Courage to Act at 248-69 (cited in note 61).
176 See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *324-44 (cited in note 58).
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Even putting to one side the inherent uncertainty involved in
determining which nonbanks could pose a risk to the broader fi-
nancial system, there still remains a good deal of indeterminacy
about the best way to assess which particular nonbanks are most
likely to be systemically significant for at least three reasons.
First, there is currently limited consensus about the complete set
of firm-specific characteristics that are relevant to diagnosing sys-
temic risk. For instance, it is hardly clear that the six categories
identified by FSOC represent an exhaustive list of relevant fac-
tors or an ideal framing of these factors. Indeed, FSOC itself has
suggested that an additional relevant factor involves the complex-
ity and resolvability of a financial institution, reflecting both the
emphasis in other parts of Dodd-Frank on promoting the quick
and orderly resolution of failing firms and the lack of any such
orderly resolution mechanism in the case of Lehman Brothers77
Similarly, internationally developed frameworks for assessing
the systemic risks posed by nonbank financial firms emphasize
other factors, such as the number of different countries in which
a firm operates, as well as a firm's involvement in specific activi-
ties that are "non-traditional" for firms in that sector.1 78
Second, myriad questions remain about how to measure or
assess those factors that are clearly centrally important to iden-
tifying systemically risky nonbanks. Some relevant factors-such
as existing regulatory scrutiny and substitutability-are not
readily susceptible to reliable quantitative assessment.1 79 Their
appraisal will therefore inevitably vary on the perspectives and
assumptions of the assessor. Moreover, many of the other rele-
vant factors can be assessed quantitatively in a large variety of
ways, none of which perfectly captures the linkage between the
relevant characteristic and systemic risk concerns. For instance,
FSOC itself identifies seven different potential measures of in-
terconnectedness, four potential measures of leverage, and
seven different measures of maturity mismatch.180 Even the
seemingly straightforward category of size can be measured in
multiple ways, ranging from total consolidated assets to total
consolidated liabilities to total risk in force.181 Making matters
177 See text accompanying notes 128-29.
178 See International Association of Insurance Supervisors, Global Systematically Im-
portant Insurers: Initial Assessment Methodology *12 (July 18, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/A85S-5353.





even more complicated, the most appropriate measurement of
any particular factor will in most cases depend on numerous sec-
ondary considerations.
Third, even among the firm characteristics that are broadly
recognized as relevant to the systemic risk inquiry-such as the
six FSOC categories-and that can be reliably measured, there is
no single agreed-on approach to assessing their relative im-
portance. 182 As above, it is likely that the relative importance of
any particular firm's characteristics itself depends on the broader
context.18  For instance, while (as suggested earlier) maturity mis-
match is perhaps the most important characteristic of a SIFI, the
systemic implications of this characteristic almost certainly de-
pend on size and interconnectedness as well. A run on a financial
institution of any type will likely have limited systemic conse-
quences if the institution is not big enough or interconnected
enough to transmit panic elsewhere in the system. Thus, the run
on Lehman and Bear resulted in broader panic predominantly be-
cause these institutions were large and so interconnected with the
broader financial system. 184
Not only is maturity mismatch not a sufficient condition for
diagnosing nonbank SIFIs, it is also not a necessary condition.
This point is easiest to see for institutions that serve fundamental
and irreplaceable roles in the context of the larger financial sys-
tem. For instance, the failure of GSEs like Fannie and Freddie
would almost certainly generate immense financial instability
even if they were not subject to any type of run, given the
fundamental role that these institutions play in the mortgage
markets.185 Moreover, it is hardly inconceivable that an institu-
tion could prove systemically risky even if it was not subject to a
182 Some international bodies have attempted to specify relative weights to systemic
risk factors. For instance, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors specifies
the relative weights of each of its risk factors, devoting primary weight to interconnected-
ness and the firm's participation in nontraditional activities. See Global Systematically
Important Insurers at *12 (cited in note 178). This latter category includes activities that
create an asset-liability mismatch, but might also include a number of other activities.
See generally id.
183 See 77 Fed Reg at 21639 (cited in note 123) (noting that each firm can pose sys-
temic risks in unique ways).
184 See Part I.A. Similarly, the run on AIG would likely not have been systemically
significant were it not for AIG's sheer size, as well as the fact that its major counterparties
in both its CDS and securities-lending portfolios were many of the other largest financial
institutions in the country. Even the run on the Prime Fund would not have produced the
panic that it did if investors did not reasonably believe that the fund's portfolio of invest-
ments was likely correlated with the investments of most other money market funds.
185 See Davidoff and Zaring, 61 Admin L Rev at 484-91 (cited in note 53).
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clear "run" by short-term creditors. This possibility was arguably
illustrated by the savings and loan (S&L) crisis, which dragged
on for years without any acute period of destabilizing runs and
nonetheless required massive bailouts to avoid potentially grave
damage to the larger macroeconomy. 186
For all these reasons, it is currently not possible to precisely
define when nonbank firms may pose systemic risks to the
broader financial system. FSOC itself comes close to acknowledg-
ing as much, explaining that it is not possible to "reduce[] to a
formula" the identification of firms as systemically significant
"due to the unique threat that each nonbank financial company
may pose to U.S. financial stability and the qualitative nature of"
many of the relevant factors.187 But the difficulty is even greater
than this acknowledgement suggests: ultimately the process of
identifying nonbank SIFIs is inherently indeterminate and con-
testable, at least with respect to the subset of firms that fall rela-
tively close to the border in either direction.
These conclusions are reflected by an independent assess-
ment of FSOC's designation process by the nonpartisan
Congressional Research Service (CRS). This review, which in-
cluded both public designations as well as confidential memo-
randa explaining FSOC's basis for declining to advance to Stage 3
various nonbank firms, was unable "to replicate that the FSOC's
process was more likely to designate a firm if it posed a greater
threat to financial stability than if it did not."188 This result fol-
lowed naturally from the fact that FSOC's "documents did not in-
clude a framework for combining different sources of financial
stability into a standard that could be used to distinguish between
186 See generally Timothy Curry and Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan
Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC Bank Rev 26 (Fall 2000). The S&L crisis refers
to a period between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s when thrift depository institutions
failed in historically unprecedented numbers. The primary source of these failures was
home loans that thrifts had made earlier to borrowers at fixed interest rates. These fixed
interest rates on the thrifts' assets ended up being lower than the very high interest rates
that thrifts had to pay to their depositors to remain competitive. Thrifts thus ended up
borrowing money from their depositors at a higher rate than they invested them. During
the early years of the crisis, regulators failed to shut these failing thrifts down, allowing
them to attempt to grow their way out of their troubles and take on more risk in the pro-
cess. Ultimately, over one thousand thrifts, holding more than $500 billion in assets, failed
during this time period. See Michael S. Barr, Howell E. Jackson, and Margaret E. Tahyar,
Financial Regulation: Law and Policy 54-55, 167-71 (Foundation 2016).
187 77 Fed Reg at 21641-42 (cited in 123).
188 FSOC Nonbank Designation Process at *9 (cited in note 11) (reproducing a portion
of the CRS memo).
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firms."189 At the same time, the CRS review did indeed affirm that
FSOC's analysis of individual firms "in isolation" each generally
identified "plausible threat[s] to financial stability."190
III. REGULATION BY THREAT: THE LOGIC OF FSOC's
REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE
Parts I and II raise a seemingly intractable problem of regu-
latory design. How can nonbank firms like Prudential be pre-
vented from becoming systemically risky when this risk is ever
changing, nonbank firms have more incentive than ever to affirm-
atively seek out systemic risk, and regulators do not know pre-
cisely how to diagnose systemically risky nonbanks? This Part ar-
gues that FSOC's designation regime solves this challenge by
operating as a dual threat against both individual firms that
would seek out systemic risk and their primary regulators who
might permit this to happen under their watch.
Part III.A develops the first point, showing how FSOC's des-
ignation power combined with its refusal to reduce designation to
a simple formula or to articulate firm-specific "off-ramps" for des-
ignation prevents nonbank firms from seeking out systemic risk.
The reason, we argue, is that the threat of designation-and the
"enhanced supervision and prudential standards"191 that come
along with it-deters firms from embracing strategies that could
render them systemically significant. This is clearly evidenced by
the actions of firms that have been designated as systemically sig-
nificant to date. To be sure, the amorphous nature of FSOC's des-
ignation regime creates uncertainty for some firms on the border-
line of the systemic risk designation.192 But this uncertainty is a
necessary downside of an FSOC regime whose primary goal is not
to correctly identify every systemically significant nonbank firm
but is instead to reliably prevent most nonbank firms from taking
on the pre-crisis systemic risk profiles of firms like AIG, Lehman
189 Id.
190 See id.
191 Dodd-Frank Act § 165, 124 Stat at 1423-32, 12 USC § 5365.
192 As we suggest later, the actual scope of this uncertainty is not as significant as
many FSOC critics suggest. See Part IV.
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Brothers, or Bear Stearns. In this sense, the FSOC regime of reg-
ulation by threat is one way of implementing the precautionary
principle.193
As applied here, FSOC's use of the designation threat to in-
still caution in firms leaves regulators with a margin of safety,
even if they cannot forecast with great reliability which specific
nonbank financial institutions will be implicated in the next fi-
nancial crisis; as we have observed, the council's context is pre-
cisely the sort of area in which observers like Professor
Sunstein-no fan of the precautionary principle in most cases-
finds a variant of it to be compelling.194 While this Part focuses on
the effectiveness and necessity of the FSOC designation regime
as regulation by threat, we reserve to Part IV the related issue of
whether this method is a legitimate way to approach a regulatory
enterprise.
Part III.B then turns to the second element of FSOC's dual
threat, describing how FSOC's designation authority allows it to
operate as an effective and credible watchdog over nonbank firms'
primary financial regulators. As noted above, Dodd-Frank cre-
ated new rules for both certain specific nonbank financial compa-
nies, such as hedge funds, and for financial activities that are en-
gaged in by a variety of different types of nonbanks, such as
derivatives trading. But these rules require extensive develop-
ment and enforcement, leave unaddressed key issues, and will in-
evitably be gamed by firms. FSOC's designation authority threat-
ens nonbank firms' primary regulators with the prospect of losing
193 We, like most of the world's scientists and the World Trade Organization's Appel-
late Body, find the European Union's invocation of the precautionary principle to ban im-
ports of beef treated with hormones from the United States to be unpromising. See, for
example, European Communities-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body (Jan 16, 1998),
WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R 45-46 at ¶1 123-25 (describing the role of the precau-
tionary principle in international law and finding that the principle could not defeat plain
treaty language); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How
Far Can We Go?, 95 Am J Intl L 535, 569-70 (2001) (arguing that the World Trade Organ-
ization decision was "correct"). On the other hand, no one doubts that some applications
of a precautionary principle are appropriate, such as the old rule of thumb about the crim-
inal justice system-better that ten guilty men go free rather than one innocent man be
convicted. See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U Pa L Rev 173 (1997). But
see generally Daniel Epps, The Consequence of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 Harv L Rev
1065 (2015).
194 Sunstein, 91 Cornell L Rev at 845 (cited in note 29) ("When regulators lack infor-
mation about the likelihood and magnitude of a risk, it makes sense to spend extra re-




regulatory turf to the Fed if they fail to effectively develop, en-
force, and fill in these rules, both in the near term and in the fu-
ture. Here again, we suggest that this fact is clearly evidenced by
various regulatory reforms that have evolved since Dodd-Frank's
passage.
A. FSOC Designation and Firm-Level Deterrence
In order to deter nonbank systemic risk, FSOC designation
must not only impact firms' behavior, but do so in a way that is
likely to reduce their prospect of contributing to a financial crisis.
We address these two components in turn. Part III.A. 1 shows that
the threat of FSOC designation has clearly impacted large non-
banks' strategies, activities, and structures. Part III.A.2 then ar-
gues that these shifts meaningfully reduce nonbanks' systemic
riskiness.
1. The deterrent force of designation.
As implemented and applied, the FSOC designation regime
incentivizes nonbanks to eschew activities and strategies that
they anticipate would subject them to designation. This is a direct
result of the panoply of mandatory enhanced prudential stand-
ards imposed on systemically important firms, including require-
ments relating to risk-based capital, liquidity, risk management,
resolution planning, single-counterparty credit limits, and stress
tests.195 These rules have the obvious potential to impose huge
costs on designated firms, both in terms of (i) direct compliance
costs and (ii) binding restrictions that would alter the firms' deci-
sions and strategies.196 Indeed, Dodd-Frank itself specifies that
the rules for nonbank SIFIs must be "more stringent"197 than
those that apply to nondesignated firms.198
However, the actual costs to designated firms of these en-
hanced prudential standards depend crucially on how much more
stringent they are than the prudential rules that the nonbank
would otherwise face. Firms that are already subject to the types
of regulation and supervision that Dodd-Frank imposes on
195 See Part II.A.
196 See Skinner, 105 Georgetown L J at 1397-1408 (cited in note 47) ("This kind of
regulation is not only expensive ... but it is also operationally intrusive and potentially
disruptive to a firm's investor (and other) relationships.").
197 Dodd-Frank Act § 115(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat at 1403, 12 USC § 5325(a)(1)(A).
198 See Part II.A.
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nonbank SIFIs might well believe that the marginal costs of des-
ignation would be minimal. By contrast, the marginal costs stem-
ming from designation would be large indeed with respect to non-
banks that are very lightly regulated in their baseline regime.
For nonbanks that are not substantially engaged in the busi-
ness of insurance, the costs and constraints of the enhanced pru-
dential standards resulting from FSOC designation are almost
certain to be immense. This is because these firms' ordinary reg-
ulatory regimes are focused predominantly on investor protec-
tion, with only limited prudential rules that are different in kind
from those accompanying designation. For instance, while broker-
dealers are subject to capital requirements, they are not risk
based, and regulators do not affirmatively monitor broker-
dealers' capital levels.199 Similarly, broker-dealers are not ordi-
narily subject to liquidity requirements, stress tests, or resolution
planning requirements. 00 The same basic points apply to invest-
ment advisors and the various different types of pooled-
investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and hedge funds,
which have not traditionally been subject to risk-based capital re-
quirements, stress tests, or resolution planning.201
Although the marginal costs of enhanced prudential stand-
ards flowing from designation are less obvious for firms predomi-
nantly engaged in insurance, they are nonetheless almost certain
to be quite large in this setting, as well. Unlike most nonbanks,
insurers are indeed subject to most-though not al1202-of the
types of mandated prudential standards applicable to designated
firms, including risk-based capital rules, stress tests, investment
restrictions, and single-counterparty credit limits.203 But even
199 See Carnell, Miller, and Macey, The Law of Financial Institutions at 130-36 (cited
in note 46).
200 Margin requirements may act as a substitute for capital rules. See id.
201 The SEC has long imposed liquidity and leverage restrictions on registered funds,
though these rules do not apply to unregistered funds like hedge funds. However, FSOC
has recently questioned the robustness of these restrictions for registered funds for pur-
poses of financial stability. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Update on Review
of Asset Management Products and Firms *6-8 (Apr 18, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/T8B9-YSVC.
202 State insurance regulation has limited liquidity-oriented requirements, though
some of the financial monitoring that the NAIC performs for states arguably promoted
liquidity. State insurance regulation also lacks clear resolution-planning requirements
analogous to a living will, although it does have an "Own Risk Solvency Assessment" that
may partially serve an overlapping function. See generally Schwarcz, 5 UC Irvine L Rev
537 (cited in note 66).
203 See Kenneth S. Abraham and Daniel Schwarcz, Insurance Law and Regulation
104-72 (Foundation 6th ed 2015).
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apart from the specific content of these rules-which are still un-
der construction-there is a crucial distinction between the pru-
dential standards imposed by state insurance regulation and
those required of systemically significant firms. Dodd-Frank re-
quires all of its prudential requirements to apply across an entire
consolidated financial entity.24 By contrast, essentially all of the
prudential rules imposed by state insurance regulation focus ex-
clusively on individual insurance companies, while ignoring their
holding companies and noninsurer affiliates.205 Thus, the pruden-
tial regime imposed on insurance-focused nonbank SIFIs would
indeed come along with a fundamentally different set of re-
strictions than those that exist in the baseline state regime.
The evidence to date strongly supports the conclusion that
most nonbank financial firms have powerful financial incentives
to avoid FSOC designation.20 Consider first market reactions to
MetLife's successful challenge in district court to its designa-
tion.207 When the district court's decision was publicly released,
MetLife's stock jumped around 5 percent, and the stock of
Prudential, a fellow insurance-focused SIFI, advanced 1.6 per-
cent. 208 These stock-price increases likely understate the value to
the firms of avoiding designation, as the judge had earlier indi-
cated her skepticism of FSOC's designation, meaning that at least
some of the benefit to MetLife of potentially winning its case was
204 See Schwarcz, 5 UC Irvine L Rev at 545 (cited in note 66).
205 See id. Dodd-Frank does allow for the creation of an intermediate financial holding
company so that the prudential rules do not apply to legal entities not engaged predomi-
nantly in financial activities. Dodd-Frank Act § 113(c)(3), 124 Stat at 1400, 12 USC
§ 5323(c)(3).
206 This conclusion is not obvious. In fact, at least some firms have claimed in lawsuits
that designation actually benefits the designated firms by sending the signal that these
firms will not be allowed to fail. See State National Bank of Big Spring v Lew, 795 F3d 48,
55 (DC Cir 2015) (rejecting on standing grounds this type of claim by a competitor of GE).
207 In addition to their efforts to avoid federal regulation as a result of designation,
insurers have undoubtedly also sought to avoid regulation by the Fed that could result
from being or owning a depository institution. Numerous insurers have thus divested
themselves of their banking assets. As one lawyer has explained, "It's to get out from under
federal regulation." Andrew Frye, Bank-Wannabe Insurers Switch Strategies to Avoid
Oversight (Bloomberg, Aug 3, 2011), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/20 11-08-03/bank-wannabe-insurers-seek-to-avoid-oversight (visited May 16,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that "Hartford Financial Services Group Inc.
struck a deal in May to sell the lender that it had acquired in 2009 to qualify for a bailout").
208 See Andrew M. Harris and Katherine Chiglinsky, MetLife Judge Called FSOC
Review Process 'Fatally Flawed' (Bloomberg, Apr 7, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/YY44-R34H.
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already baked into its stock price.209 And even after the district-
court opinion, there remains a reasonable chance that the deci-
sion may be overturned on appeal or else that FSOC might again
attempt to designate MetLife.
Second, at least three of the four designated firms have seri-
ously entertained proposals to radically alter their structure and
activities in an effort to avoid the costs of designation. Consider
MetLife, which, prior to successfully defeating its designation in
district court, announced the sale of three of its insurers that sell
variable annuities and the cessation of its future variable annuity
sales.210 This "significant strategic shift" in the company's opera-
tions was driven substantially by MetLife's hope that it would
assist the company in shedding its designation.211 Consistent with
these explanations, MetLife has repeatedly claimed that its SIFI
designation "risks [exposing it to] higher capital requirements
that could put it at a significant competitive disadvantage."212
GE Capital has taken even greater steps to reduce its risk
profile, an effort that was rewarded in June 2016 when it became
the first firm to have its designation rescinded by FSOC.213 Be-
tween its designation and that time, GE Capital fundamentally
transformed its business model. Most notably, it substantially re-
duced its reliance on commercial paper, thus largely eliminating
its use of short-term financing. It also reduced its assets 52 per-
cent, from $549 billion to $265 billion, largely exited the business
of giving loans to consumers, and sold off its FDIC-insured sub-
sidiaries as well as its commercial leasing business.214 Addition-
ally, the firm dramatically reduced the number of its subsidiaries,
209 The change in stock price can be explained either by designation preventing firms
from taking risks that they idiosyncratically would prefer to take or by designation impos-
ing large compliance costs.
210 See Kerry Pechter, MetLife to Let VA Liabilities Go (Retirement Income J, Jan 14,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/Q674-4XKR.
211 See MetLife Move Has Implications for Global Insurers (Fitch Ratings, Jan 13,
2016), online at http://www.fitchratings.com/site/pr/997834 (visited Aug 25, 2017) (Perma
archive unavailable); John Heltman, MetLife to Break Itself Up, Citing 'Regulatory Envi-
ronment' (Am Banker, Jan 12, 2016), online at http://www.americanbanker.com/news/
metlife-to-break-itself-up-citing-regulatory-environment (visited Aug 25, 2017) (Perma ar-
chive unavailable).
212 MetLife Announces Plan to Pursue Separation of U.S. Retail Business (MetLife,
Jan 12, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/F487-HTZS. See also MetLife to Ask Federal
Court to Review SIFI Designation (MetLife, Jan 13, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/RZ62-ZB92.
213 See generally Rescission of GE Determination (cited in note 17).
214 Id at *23.
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making the firm less complicated, and if necessary, easier to re-
solve.215 In granting GE Capital's request for de-designation, the
council emphasized its "smaller size, . . . limited scale of activi-
ties in key funding markets, [and] decreased direct and indirect
exposures."216
AIG has also fundamentally altered its structure in order to
achieve de-designation. In 2015, activist investors Carl Icahn and
John Paulson proposed that AIG become "a smaller, simpler com-
pany with a path to [de-designation]."217 In initially rejecting
these proposals, AIG emphasized both the efficiencies of operat-
ing at a large scale as well as the "false premise" that breaking
itself up would allow it to shed its SIFI designation.218 By contrast,
it did not contest the costs to the firm of the enhanced prudential
standards and supervision to which it is subject as a result of des-
ignation.219 But while it asserted the power to reject overtures to
restructure, it did alter its business substantially, reducing head-
count by half from its 2008 highs and selling nearly $100 billion
of assets, including life insurance businesses, to its rival
MetLife.22o Its progress on restructuring itself-alongside the
change in FSOC's composition resulting from the 2016 election-
led to its de-designation in 2017, the second de-designation made
by the council, after GE Capital.221
2. Firm-level deterrence and the reduction of systemic risk.
Both theory and evidence therefore suggest that FSOC's des-
ignation regime causes nonbank firms to avoid strategies that
they believe are likely to expose them to designation as a SIFI. To
critics, however, this conclusion only raises the further question
whether nonbank firms' changes in behavior actually reduce sys-
temic risk, and at what cost. Critics often contend that it is diffi-
cult for nonbank firms to discern meaningful guidance from
215 See GE Capital Files Request for Rescission of Status as a Systemically Important
Financial Institution (GE, Mar 31, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/BS9Q-AT9K.
216 Rescission of GE Determination at *8 (cited in note 17).
217 Cark Icahn, Open Letter to MG Board (Jan 19, 2016), archived at
http://perma.cc/3YE8-8QGL.
218 Stephen Gandel, MG CEO: Carl Icahn's Breakup Plan Is Based on a False Premise
(Fortune, Jan 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/529P-2KC7.
219 See generally id.
220 See Sonali Basak and Katherine Chiglinsky, MG Finds 'Safer Harbor'after Years
of Retrenchment, Regulation (Bloomberg, Oct 2, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/2LH5
-DGKS.
221 See generally Rescission of AIG Determination (cited in note 19).
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FSOC's decisions and broad framework.222 As a result, nonbank
firms must frequently resort to guessing about what activities or
strategies FSOC might believe would make them systemically
risky. Not only does this produce substantial market uncertainty
for firms, but it may well deter activities and strategies that
FSOC itself might not believe to be systemically risky were it to
consider the issue carefully in the context of the specific firm at
issue. AIG's initial resistance to shareholders' break-up proposals
illustrates this point well: AIG's management disputed that it
could shed designation by breaking itself up, but analysis of this
issue was simply guesswork. AIG was thus forced to make a major
strategic decision on the basis of uncertain information about how
its actions would be perceived by FSOC.
Understanding FSOC designation as regulation by threat
suggests that these concerns, while eminently reasonable, are
both inevitable and of second-order importance. This is because
the key benefit and purpose of FSOC designation does not involve
its impact on firms that are close to the murky and indeterminate
line separating systemically risky firms from those that are not
systemically risky. Instead, the key benefit of FSOC designation
is that it reliably prevents nonbank firms from making business
decisions in the future that will result in them being firmly on the
systemically risky side of this dividing line. With FSOC's desig-
nation regime in place, there is little risk that any nonbank firm
will take on the pre-crisis systemic risk profiles of AIG or the large
investment banks like Lehman or Bear.223 This is particularly im-
portant given the point, developed above, that-in the absence of
countervailing regulatory initiatives-the 2008 bailouts gave
nonbank firms both an affirmative incentive to seek out systemic
risk and a road map for how to accomplish this.224
The very same standard-like malleability of FSOC designa-
tion that generates the ire of FSOC's critics is essential to ensur-
ing that FSOC designation achieves this primary goal of deterring
nonbank firms from seeking to become the next AIG, Lehman, or
Bear. Although FSOC's embrace of a malleable standard, rather
than a formulaic rule, does indeed create uncertainty for nonbank
222 See generally, for example, FSOC Nonbank Designation Process (cited in note 11).
223 One important exception here involves the GSEs. But these are a special case be-
cause they are under conservatorship and are generally viewed as being essential to the
mortgage market in their present form. Moreover, the ongoing debate about how to reform
their role in the mortgage markets has seemingly exempted them from designation as
SIFIs by FSOC.
224 See Part I.B.
[84:18131856
Regulation by Threat
firms close to the line of designation, it also makes the FSOC re-
gime relatively resistant to the type of regulatory arbitrage that
was so prominent among nonbanks in the run up to the crisis.225
As with all standards, FSOC's relatively flexible and adaptive
designation standard empowers its members to look past any at-
tempts by firms to recharacterize transactions, activities, or
products in a way that will generate systemic risks.226 To be sure,
the council's capacity to accomplish this depends on its level of
knowledge, expertise, and understanding. But if the members of
FSOC-the leading experts on financial regulation in the coun-
try, supported by the resources of each of their member agen-
cies-cannot detect a firm's efforts to exploit regulatory loop-
holes or blind spots, then there is little hope that anyone else
could reliably do so.
Like any common-law court, or any agency that acts through
adjudication rather than rulemaking, for that matter, the council
has chosen to identify risk beyond the pale on a case-by-case ba-
sis. The fact that uncertainty exists at the beginning of the pro-
cess of fleshing out a new policy program is not a reason to forbid
courts and regulators from taking things one case at a time. Ra-
ther, the discretion that agencies have to choose between rule-
making and adjudication is one of the fundamental principles of
administrative law.227
In fact, we believe that FSOC's designation decisions to date
amply demonstrate FSOC's capacity to use its broad framework
to target activities and strategies that exploit regulatory arbi-
trage in ways that may create new forms of systemic risk. Con-
sider just one example. In its designations of Prudential, AIG, and
MetLife, FSOC highlighted these firms' use of captive reinsur-
ance transactions, also known as "shadow insurance."228 In these
transactions, an insurer purchases reinsurance from an affiliated
226 See Part II.A. See also Examining Insurance Capital Rules and FSOC Process,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investments of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 114th Cong, 1st Sess 7 (2015) (state-
ment of Professor Daniel Schwarcz).
226 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
Duke L J 557 (1992).
227 See, for example, National Labor Relations Board v Bell Aerospace Co, 416 US
267, 294 (1974) (explaining that an agency "is not precluded from announcing new princi-
ples in an adjudicative proceeding and [ I the choice between rulemaking and adjudication
lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion").
228 See generally Daniel Schwarcz, The Risks of Shadow Insurance, 50 Ga L Rev
163 (2015).
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company that is subject to more limited regulatory scrutiny be-
cause it is organized as a "captive insurer" rather than an ordi-
nary insurer.229 State regulators generally allow the insurer to
treat this claim from its affiliate as reliable only if it is supported
by a third-party guarantee. But these guarantees are often sup-
plied by banks, in the form of a letter of credit. These banks, more-
over, frequently retain the right to look to the parent company of
the insurers or one of their affiliates for repayment if the letter of
credit is triggered.
As one of us has argued extensively in other work, these
shadow insurance transactions represent a form of regulatory ar-
bitrage that has the potential to result in large insurance-focused
entities becoming systemically risky.230 For instance, they expose
insurers to substantial asset-liability mismatch risk because the
letters of credit that back these transactions are generally rela-
tively short-term, even though the underlying liabilities they
back are long term. They also increase interconnectedness risk by
increasing the connections between the insurance and banking
sectors. Perhaps most obviously, they increase the complexity and
resolvability of large insurance firms. By targeting these shadow
insurance transactions in its designations of insurance-focused
nonbanks, FSOC illustrates how its standard for designation can
be used to counteract new and emerging forms of regulatory arbi-
trage that have the potential to render a nonbank firm systemi-
cally risky.231
Perhaps even more importantly, FSOC can effectively deter
nonbank firms from seeking out systemic risk through regulatory
arbitrage even if it misses some systemically risky forms of such
arbitrage while incorrectly identifying others. So long as FSOC
presents a credible threat to nonbanks that systemically risky ar-
bitrage strategies will result in designation, it will deter efforts
by firms to test this system. As amply illustrated by financial
firms' complaints regarding the uncertainty generated by FSOC's
229 Id at 166.
230 See id at 164-65, 207. See also generally Ralph S.J. Koijen and Motohiro Yogo,
Shadow Insurance, 84 Econometrica 1265 (2016); Ralph S.J. Koijen and Motohiro Yogo,
Risk of Life Insurers: Recent Trends and Transmission Mechanisms, in Felix Hufeld, Ralph
S.J. Koijen, and Christian Thimann, eds, The Economics, Regulation, and Systemic Risk
of Insurance Markets ch 4 (Oxford 2016).
231 A consolidated regulatory capital standard, such as that proposed by the Fed for
designated firms in its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, see note 115, would
eliminate the regulatory arbitrage benefits of shadow insurance because firm capital
would be insensitive to the placement of individual assets and liabilities in different legal
entities within the larger conglomerate.
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designation regime, financial firms have strong reasons to avoid
regulatory uncertainty, which can threaten not only the standard
regulatory costs but also negative publicity and executives' jobs.
Contrary arguments that FSOC's designation regime will af-
firmatively prompt regulatory arbitrage are, we believe, unper-
suasive. For instance, Professor Christina Skinner has suggested
that the binary nature of the FSOC designation standard will lead
firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage to avoid designation.232 In
particular, Skinner suggests that the extreme consequences of
designation will cause some firms to shop for an alternative reg-
ulator other than the Fed and then attempt to claim that desig-
nation is not warranted because they are already adequately reg-
ulated.233 We find this argument unconvincing, because FSOC has
the authority to designate any nonbank financial firm as a SIFI,
irrespective of who that firm's regulator is. As such, the only way
that a firm could decrease its chances of being designated by shop-
ping for a regulator would be if FSOC deemed that regulator to
be effective with respect to systemic risk. This point is amply il-
lustrated by the MetLife case, in which FSOC specifically rejected
MetLife's arguments that it was sufficiently regulated by noting
the ways in which state insurance regulation does not address
systemic stability.234 More generally, the standard-like nature of
the relevant criterion-which examines the adequacy of existing
regulation-limits the capacity of firms to rely on arbitrage strat-
egies involving regulator shopping to avoid FSOC designation.
Because of the uncertainties of predicting the future in fi-
nance-an art that no one has been able to master with any reli-
ability-there is little doubt that FSOC will err on occasion in its
assessment of whether any particular nonbank is systemically
significant or in its explanation for this conclusion. But there is
not, at the present time, any reasonable alternative for defini-
tively determining when a nonbank is systemically significant,
and any attempt to devise such a test would ultimately suffer
the same fate as the pre-crisis distinction between banks and
nonbanks.235
232 See Skinner, 105 Georgetown L J at 1401-02 (cited in note 47).
233 See id at 1402.
234 See MetLife Designation at *26-29 (cited in note 147).
235 To be sure, there are a large number of quantitative tests that aim to measure
systemic risk, such as SRisk. See generally Monica Billio, et al, Econometric Measures of
Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J Fin Econ
535 (2012); Viral Acharya, Robert Engel, and Matthew Richardson, Capital Shortfall: A
New Approach to Ranking and Regulating Systemic Risks, 102 Am Econ Rev 59 (May
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More importantly, understanding FSOC's designation pro-
cess as regulation by threat means that it does not actually need
to be completely accurate to achieve its broader purpose of pre-
venting nonbanks from becoming systemically risky. Assuring
precision in placing each financial institution on the correct side
of the riskiness line is less important than the ability of FSOC to
draw a line with a margin of safety.
Actually achieving the broader purpose of FSOC's designa-
tion regime-reduction of systemic risk outside of the banking
system-is of paramount importance. Regulatory scrutiny should
be particularly high in the face of substantial uncertainty about
the costs of the conduct being regulated, along with the substan-
tial prospect of an extreme downside.236 As Professor Hilary Allen
has observed, precautionary approaches make particular sense
when it comes to financial regulation; she argues that "financial
regulatory agencies should take a precautionary approach in
drafting and implementing rules that relate to financial stability,
and the courts should show deference when reviewing precaution-
ary acts by financial regulatory agencies."237
B. FSOC Designation and the Adaptation of Primary Financial
Regulations
The big stick of designation not only deters financial firms
from seeking out excessive risk; it also deters primary regulators
of nonbanks from shirking in their efforts to account for systemic
risk. Shirking could come in the form of primary regulators'lack-
luster efforts to implement or enforce Dodd-Frank's reforms
aimed at limiting systemic risk outside of the banking sector,
such as derivative clearinghouses or new reporting. rules for
hedge funds. Alternatively, it might consist of failing to address
issues left unresolved in Dodd-Frank, such as reform of GSEs or
money market mutual funds. Perhaps most importantly, pri-
mary financial regulators might shirk by ignoring unanticipated
2012). Although these measures provide one important perspective on systemic risk, there
is also little doubt that they cannot accurately and reliably distinguish between systemi-
cally significant institutions and those that are not systemically significant. See generally
Lars Peter Hansen, Challenges in Identifying and Measuring Systemic Risk, in Markus
Brunnermeier and Arvind Krishnamurthy, eds, Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and
Macro Modeling 15 (Chicago 2014). This is precisely why no existing regulatory regime
has tethered its approach to these quantitative measures, even if they consider them as
one relevant factor in their analysis.
236 See Sunstein, Laws of Fear at 61 (cited in note 28).
237 Allen, 45 Loyola U Chi L J at 178 (cited in note 26).
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changes in financial markets that require a change in their reg-
ulatory approach.
As described in Part II, Dodd-Frank grants FSOC limited di-
rect authority over primary financial regulators.23 FSOC's desig-
nation power nonetheless operates as an effective threat against
primary financial regulators who refuse to follow FSOC's sugges-
tions and do not offer a convincing explanation for this decision.
This is because designation-while nominally aimed at specific
nonbank firms-simultaneously operates as a deterrent to that
firm's regulator by threatening to intrude on its regulatory turf.
Even though FSOC designation does not strip a primary regula-
tor of its authority over a designated firm, it no doubt diminishes
the authority and power of that primary regulator. For instance,
"more stringent" prudential rules imposed by the Fed as a result
of designation will in many cases obviate parallel restrictions im-
posed by a firm's primary regulator, as firms must generally focus
their compliance efforts on the most stringent regulations they
face. Relatedly, enhanced regulation by the Fed may effectively
eliminate the capacity of a firm's primary financial regulators to
grant that firm waivers or exemptions to regulatory require-
ments, or to approve nonstandard transactions or activities. Few
agencies relish the prospect of losing control over firms and in-
dustries that they traditionally regulate, so this constraint is a
real one.
FSOC designation of a firm threatens to intrude on the power
and authority of the firm's primary regulator in a second, and dis-
tinct, way. Recall that FSOC designation comes along not just
with enhanced prudential standards crafted by the Fed, but also
with enhanced supervision conducted by the Fed.239 As a result,
many of the decisions that a primary financial regulator makes in
connection with its supervision of a designated firm are indirectly
subject to oversight and assessment by the Fed itself. If, for in-
stance, a primary regulator approves a designated firm's account-
ing treatment of a transaction, but the Fed does not, then the im-
plicit (or perhaps explicit) message is that the primary financial
regulator erred. In a very real sense, then, the Fed becomes the
supervisor of both the designated firm itself and that firm's pri-
mary financial regulator.
238 See Part II.A.1.
239 See Part ILJA.2.
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FSOC would also have good reason to respond to a primary
financial regulator's refusal to adopt its recommendations by des-
ignating some of the firms that the regulator oversees. As dis-
cussed above, existing regulatory scrutiny is one of the six cate-
gories in FSOC's designation framework, and one of the ten
Dodd-Frank categories.24o Thus, it would stand to reason that a
primary financial regulator's refusal to accept an FSOC recom-
mendation would increase the potential for the firms overseen by
that regulator to be deemed systemically significant.
This capacity of FSOC's designation power to incentivize reg-
ulators to better account for systemic risk is perfectly illustrated
by FSOC's successful campaign to induce the SEC to reform its
regulation of money market funds. Recall the crucial role that
money market funds played in the financial crisis241 The industry
nonetheless opposed new regulations, particularly those that
might require it to adopt a "floating" net asset value, meaning
that shares in the funds would vary in price based on the market
value of the fund's underlying portfolio. Faced with this opposi-
tion, the SEC dithered. Enter the council. Pursuant to § 120 of
Dodd-Frank, it requested that the SEC redouble its efforts to pass
regulation reforming the money market fund industry.242 The
agency was not obligated to embrace the council's request, but it
ultimately largely did so, adopting wide-ranging reforms of the
basic type suggested by the council.243
In all likelihood, the SEC would have refused to accept
FSOC's recommendations on money market funds were it not for
the council's designation power. There is, in fact, strong evidence
that the council had explicitly threatened the SEC with the pro-
spect of designating large money market funds and their advi-
sors. As the minutes for a 2012 FSOC meeting on money market
funds indicated, the secretary of the treasury "urged the council
to take parallel steps to consider authorities under Title I . . . of
the Dodd-Frank Act in the event that the SEC is unwilling to act
240 See Part II.A.2.
241 See Part I.A.
242 See Financial Services Oversight Council, Proposed Recommendations regarding
Money Market Mutual Reform, 78 Fed Reg 4145, 4146 (2012).
243 See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Money Market Fund Reform;
Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed Reg 47736 (2014), amending 17 CFR Parts 230, 239,
270, 274, 279. See also SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform Rules (SEC, July 23,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QP35-QFU6.
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in a timely and effective manner."244 Title I is the part of the act
in which the council's designation power lies. The Treasury
Department urged the council to closely consider whether funds
meet the criteria for designation.246 If nothing else, of course,
FSOC would have had a ready-made case that these funds and
their advisors are not subject to effective systemic-risk regula-
tion if the SEC had failed to act. 2 46
To be sure, the fact that FSOC's voting members include the
heads or chairs of the various nonbank financial regulators may
well complicate FSOC's ability to effectively deter shirking among
these agencies. These FSOC members may seek to strategically
leverage their votes and connections to limit the risk that any of
the firms they oversee will be designated. For instance, the chairs
of the National Credit Union Association (NCUA) and SEC might
agree (tacitly or expressly) not to vote for designation of either
agency's regulated firms. Indeed, the NCUA chairman has pub-
licly reassured credit unions that they are extremely unlikely to
be designated as a SIFI.247 Such statements could reflect a broader
strategy on the part of the NCUA to deter FSOC from considering
a credit union as a possible SIFI. The capacity of FSOC member
agencies to derail designation of their regulated firms can also
explain why the insurance industry has been a focus of FSOC to
date: there is no federal agency that principally regulates insur-
ers to block any effort to designate these firms.
244 See Minutes of the Financial Stability Oversight Council *6 (FSOC, Sept 28, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/MLS2-7UDH.
245 Letter from Timothy Geithner to Members of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (Wall St J, Sept 27, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/4R5W-KDH7.
246 To be sure, it is not entirely clear that the SEC did everything the council would
have preferred. See Allen, 76 Ohio St L J at 1119 (cited in note 102) (describing the SEC's
final product as "much more limited [in] scale than any of the FSOC's proposals").
The SEC has also apparently been influenced by FSOC-and its capacity to designate
firms subject to the SEC's oversight-in connection with its newly proposed rules govern-
ing liquidity for mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. These rules, which were pro-
posed in September 2015, are designed to improve liquidity management, increase disclo-
sure about liquidity risk, and allow funds to implement mechanisms to pass on to
redeeming investors the transactions costs associated with redeeming shares in order to
eliminate any first-mover advantage. Although the link between FSOC designation and
the SEC's actions is not perfectly clear, FSOC has suggested reforms of these types for
asset managers. Moreover, the chairperson of the SEC has publicly acknowledged that
"FSOC's current review of the potential risks to the stability of U.S. financial system of
asset managers is a complement to the work we are now undertaking." See Mary Jo White,
Enhancing Risk Monitoring and Regulatory Safeguards for the Asset Management Indus-
try (SEC, Dec 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FJ57-AQ2X.
247 See MetLife Contesting SIFI Designation *1 (NAFCU, Oct 8, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/CY9C-4P8Z.
2017] 1863
The University of Chicago Law Review
Although these complications may well limit FSOC's capacity
to credibly threaten to designate a nonbank that is directly super-
vised by a member agency, they do not eliminate the deterrent
threat of designation. After all, FSOC can, and has, designated
firms without the unanimous support of its voting members.24s
Moreover, any agreement among voting members to refrain
from designating their regulated firms would ultimately be
hard to maintain, as six of FSOC's ten voting members are not
the primary safety-and-soundness regulators of any nonbank
financial firms.249 Thus, a single defection by one of the four
principal regulators of nonbanks with an FSOC vote-the
NCUA, SEC, Commodities Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC), or Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)-could
thwart any such agreement. Nor did the apparent objections of
the SEC prevent FSOC from successfully prodding the agency
to implement new rules governing the stability of money mar-
ket funds, as we have observed.50
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF REGULATION BY THREAT
In this Part of the Article, we defend regulation by threat
more generally as a legitimate regulatory tool, and in particular
in the way the council has deployed it. We then expand on the
ways that the structure of the council provides good-governance
checks that make up for its relatively unfettered designation dis-
cretion. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for current
policy debates that our analysis has for the council and its
members.
A. The Legitimacy of Regulation by Threat in Financial
Supervision, and Elsewhere
Supervising an industry by singling out some institutions for
particularly rigorous regulation to, in part, convey a message to
other institutions somewhat like them requires justification. The
same goes with threats to replace regulators with the Fed. Our
248 For instance, the independent member with insurance expertise dissented from
the council's designation of MetLife as a SIFI. See generally Views of the Council's Inde-
pendent Member (cited in note 117).
249 This includes the secretary of the treasury, chairman of the Fed, comptroller of the
currency, director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, chairperson of the FDIC,
and the independent member with insurance expertise.
250 See notes 242-47.
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justification turns on the fact that, although the council's opera-
tions are unique, they are not beyond the pale of precedent.
The problem posed by the council's procedures might be char-
acterized as one of consistency. Treating likes alike is thought to
be a fundamental underpinning of fairness, and fairness is of
course an important component of a legitimate government pro-
gram. 25' But FSOC's designation system arguably treats similar
firms (and competing regulators) differently.
Moreover, a traditional response to claims of arbitrariness in
administrative law turns not just on the reasonableness of a par-
ticular decision, but also on the process used to make decisions.252
The council is not unfamiliar with notice, comment, or judicial re-
view.253 But when it has used notice and comment in spelling out
its approach to designation, it has preserved for itself a quantum
of discretion in applying the designation factors to address new
and different risks, as we have seen. 2 5 4 It has also rejected invita-
tions from industry to perform a quantitative cost-benefit
analysis of its rules.255 It offers its explanations in a writing, ra-
ther than a spreadsheet.
251 But see Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 Cal L Rev 1, 5 (1974)
(arguing that the treat-likes-alike principle is "incomplete").
252 Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr, "History Belongs to the Winners": The Bazelon-
Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process /Substance Dichotomy in
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Admin L Rev 995, 998 (2006) ("An agency that ig-
nores process values invites presumably unwanted judicial scrutiny. Conversely, an
agency that scrupulously observes fundamentally fair processes will receive a higher
measure of deference from a reviewing court."). See also Loren A. Smith, Judicialization:
The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 Duke L J 427, 429 ("We have come to believe
that public hearings, public disclosure of all documents relevant to a given issue, and trial-
type methodologies for testing ideas will lead to 'better' social and economic policies by
government decisionmakers having power over large sections of the economic and social life
of the nation.").
253 See Part II.A.
254 See Part II.A.
255 There are a number of scholars who have called for quantitative cost-benefit
analysis to inform as many rules as possible. See, for example, Eric A. Posner and E. Glen
Weyl, The Case for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations, 36 Reg 30, 32-34 (Win-
ter 2013-2014); Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone?, 53 Admin L Rev
299, 303-09 (2001) (favoring, in large part, cost-benefit analysis, but observing that cost-
benefit analyses have several drawbacks); Richard L. Revesz and Michael A. Livermore,
Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and
Our Health 9-10 (Oxford 2008). But there are many who disagree. See, for example,
Coates, 124 Yale L J at 997-98 (cited in note 174) (arguing that the "capacity of anyone-
including financial regulatory agencies, OIRA, academic researchers, CBA/FR proponents,
litigators, and courts-to conduct quantified CBAJFR with any real precision or confidence
does not exist"); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L J
1981, 2042 (1998) (decrying the "[p]erils of [p]recision").
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We are untroubled by this regulatory approach. Any enforce-
ment scheme depends on singling out some unlucky wrongdoers
from a larger pool of candidates.256 As Judge Richard Posner has
observed, our legal system has never required laws to be enforced
"with Prussian thoroughness as the price of being allowed to en-
force them at all."257 The Supreme Court has emphasized that an
"agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of
the statute it is charged with enforcing."258
Given these modest constraints, prioritizing administrative
action against high-profile targets who meet the statutory
criteria, and who might deter others from illegality, might be con-
sidered good regulatory practice.259 Professors Daniel Bailis and
Robert MacCoun have noted that "high-profile enforcement ef-
forts create an exaggerated perception of legal risks, promoting
compliance with the law," and in our view this is an advantage.2o
Regulators always need to choose who they enforce against, and
they often-entirely appropriately-prioritize high-profile de-
fendants, in an effort to deter others who might find themselves
in their shoes.261
Even the idea of regulation by threat is not new-social sci-
entists have written about "regulatory threat,"22 and it is partic-
ularly well known to those who study financial regulation, for
256 The Treasury Department has indicated that its tax enforcement scheme looks in
particular for high-profile tax avoiders, and does not purport to prosecute every tax cheat.
Tax threats themselves are traditional tools in the regulatory arsenal. See Internal Reve-
nue Service, Internal Revenue Manual, Policy Statement § 1.2.20.1.1 (June 29, 2004), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/N3JF-JSZA ("Penalties are used to enhance voluntary compliance.").
257 Hameetman v City of Chicago, 776 F2d 636, 641 (7th Cir 1985). See also Oyler v
Boles, 368 US 448, 456 (1962) ("[The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.").
258 Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 831 (1985).
259 One SEC commissioner observed that "[h]igh profile cases generate significant re-
turns on the SEC's enforcement dollars by sending very public messages of deterrence."
Jacquelyn Lumb, Casey Reviews Current Enforcement Challenges (SEC Today, Sept 11,
2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007 WL 9384944).
260 Daniel S. Bailis and Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media
as Your Guide, 80 Judicature 64, 65 (1996).
261 Sometimes lawmakers threaten to tax behavior that they want less of, an idea
associated with the economist Arthur Pigou, who suggested that "[i]t is, however, possible
for the State . . . to remove the divergence . . . by 'extraordinary encouragements' or 'ex-
traordinary restraints."' A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 192 (Macmillan 4th ed
1938). For a discussion, see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw U L Rev
1227, 1242 (1995) ("[A] modern Pigouvian approach assesses taxes or charges to activities
that are environmentally harmful.").
262 Victor Stango, Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market,
46 J L & Econ 427, 430 (2003). See also Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 Stan L Rev
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whom warnings and even threats to the banking industry are part
and parcel of how informal financial regulation gets done.263 More
generally, Professor Wu has categorized a wide array of informal
agency action as, essentially, "agency threat."264 Professor Lars
Noah has dissected "administrative arm-twisting," and he ad-
judged it to be an acceptable form of regulation.265 Part of what
has animated the campaign against FSOC is thus a discomfort
with a form of regulation that in many ways is quite traditional.
Moreover, the council's refusal to provide industry-segment
safe harbors-an announcement that, say, asset management
firms could never grow too big to fail-looks entirely consistent
with the administrative practice of other law enforcement agen-
cies that must supervise an entire industry, and so are accord-
ingly unwilling to issue free passes to parts of it.266
Every agency will regulate to some degree by rule and in
other ways by what it chooses to prioritize in enforcement. When
629, 638 (2008) ("[C]ompliance with legislative threats is, in essence, an implicit and in-
formal political bargain in which the legislator barters the non-use of legislative power
with respect to a particular issue in return for a firm's (or an industry's) commitment to
change its conduct.").
263 As Professor Saule T. Omarova has observed, "[A] credible threat of targeted gov-
ernment intervention, such as a direct ban on complex financial products, and the creation
of functional substitutes for public-interest-group monitoring of the industry's perfor-
mance may serve as important external checks on the industry." Saule T. Omarova, Wall
Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U Pa L Rev
411, 475 (2011).
264 See generally Wu, 60 Duke L J 1841 (cited in note 24). Wu argues that informal
agency actions are "most useful ... when the agency faces a problem in an environment
in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a
newly invented technology or business model . . . . Conversely, in mature, settled indus-
tries, use of informal procedures is much harder to justify." Id at 1842.
265 Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delega-
tions of Authority, 1997 Wis L Rev 873, 875.
266 FSOC has retained its flexibility here, noting that it "believes financial stability
concerns may arise from liquidity and redemption risks in pooled investment vehicles,
particularly where investor redemption rights and underlying asset liquidity may not
match." Statement on Review of Asset Management Products and Activities (FSOC, Apr 18,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/558Z-6D5N.
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lawbreaking is difficult to catch-as in antitrust267 and tax eva-
sion2s--the discretion to single out some in an effort to deter
others might be defensible. When the downside risk is high, as
with nuclear power plants or hygiene in meat processing
plants, regulatory discretion might be welcome. Some observ-
ers would include terrorism and enemy-state financing in this
category of risks, and perhaps unsurprisingly, our terrorism-
financing regime works through a process of designation and
deterrence.269 And when the right approach for policymakers is
uncertain, a zone of discretion is appropriate-this might ex-
plain why diplomacy and monetary policy have not been sub-
jected to the discipline of the APA.270
As for the conventions for important administrative actions,
the traditions of ex ante precision and ex post cost-benefit
analysis are not a sine qua non of good regulation. Some of the
most effective regulations ever passed-such as the rule banning
the widespread sale of leaded gasoline271 or the rules requiring the
disclosure of information that a reasonable investor would want
to know before deciding whether to buy or sell to all market par-
ticipants, rather than a select few272-lacked these characteris-
tics. The council's approach is no outlier when compared to these
successful regimes.
267 At least, this has been the history in antitrust enforcement. See, for example, B.
Zorina Khan, Federal Antitrust Agencies and Public Policy toward Antitrust and Intellec-
tual Property, 9 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 133, 141 (1999) (noting that, in a sample of cases
brought between the 1970s and the present, "the correspondence in the identity of anti-
trust firms with a list of firms that are household names suggests the possibility that an-
titrust authorities are pursuing a 'big bang' policy, where limited resources are allocated
towards the prosecution of cases that are most likely to generate attention").
268 The idea is explicitly one of deterrence: "[H]igh-profile cases emphasize the abili-
ties and enforcement power of the IRS's criminal investigators, sending the message that
'If the IRS can get these untouchables, certainly they can get me."' Stephen W. Mazza,
Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U Kan L Rev 1065, 1126 (2003). See also Kelly
Phillips Erb, IRS Investigations, Prosecutions for Tax Crimes Up in 2013 (Fortune, Feb
26, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LK34-LWGM (noting the increase in high-profile
criminal tax prosecutions of, among others, the mayor of Detroit).
269 See note 35 and accompanying text.
270 See 5 USC § 553 (exempting foreign and military affairs from APA rulemaking
requirements). See also David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee, 78.3 L & Contemp Probs 157, 158, 171-76 (2015) (describing the administrative
law of the committee and observing that it is not constrained by the APA).
271 Craig N. Oren, When Must EPA Set Ambient Air Quality Standards? Looking Back
at NRDC v. Train, 30 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 157, 181 (2012) ("[T]he leaded gasoline rules
were the chief cause of a ninety-nine percent reduction in lead emissions to the air from
1970 to 2005, clearly a record of success.").
272 17 CFR Part 243. See also Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure Revisited *1 (SEC, Dec 2001), archived at http://perma.cc/SNH7-7TAT (reporting that
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B. The Substantive Constraints on the Council's Authority
Although regulation by threat can therefore be a legitimate
tool in some circumstances, there is little doubt that it must be
constrained to prevent abuses of power and excessive uncer-
tainty. Although FSOC does retain substantial discretion to des-
ignate nonbanks, that discretion is subject to important sub-
stantive constraints.
Some of these restrictions are embedded within Dodd-Frank
or FSOC's implementing rules, and discussed at length in
Part II.A. These include the requirement that 85 percent of a
firm's activities must be "financial in nature" for it to be desig-
nated and that the designation decision must include considera-
tion of ten relevant factors.273 Even more importantly, they in-
clude the panoply of Stage 1 quantitative triggers including,
perhaps most importantly, the $50 billion asset threshold.274 The
vast majority of nonbanks do not pass these Stage 1 triggers, and
can confidently determine this for themselves.271
But the substantive limits on FSOC's designation authority
extend beyond these straightforward examples. First, FSOC's
three-stage procedure for considering firms for designation limits
its capacity to designate nonbank financial firms that were previ-
ously examined in Stages 2 or 3 and deemed not to pose a sys-
temic threat. Firms that pass Stage 1 of the FSOC process but
were ultimately not designated are aware of these facts.276 As a
result, these firms can generally rest assured that they will not
be designated in the future if they do not substantially alter their
balance sheet and activities. Were FSOC to reverse course on a
prior determination without such a shift in the firm's risk profile,
a court would almost certainly set aside this action as arbitrary
and capricious.
Second, FSOC's discretion regarding the substantive criteria
for identifying nonbank SIFIs will naturally diminish over time
the rule was proposed in January 2000 and adopted in August 2000; notably, this report
reviewing the rule one year after implementation contains no cost-benefit analysis). For
an overview, see Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:
A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw U L Rev 135, 163 (2002).
273 See notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
274 See Part IL A.1.
275 Although FSOC retained its right to consider a firm for designation if it did not
pass Stage 1, it would face a substantially heightened burden if it in fact acted against
such a firm. See 77 Fed Reg at 21642-45 (cited in note 123).
276 See Part II.A.
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as more precedents and explanations for those precedents de-
velop. FSOC has taken a rather explicit wait-and-see approach
about designating the largest asset managers-such as
BlackRock-as SIFIs, in part because the SEC's rules are still in
development.277 The same uncertainty no doubt applies in the con-
text of the GSEs, as FSOC has to date refrained from designating
any of the GSEs because of the uncertainty regarding the regula-
tory environment that these firms face.278 But in both instances,
this uncertainty is likely to be a temporary result of the fact that
core elements of the primary regulatory regime for these entities
are still under development. Once essential questions are re-
solved about how to regulate these types of firms and the activi-
ties in which they engage, then the nonbanks that populate these
industries will have substantially more certainty about their sta-
tus as nonbank SIFIs.
None of this supports a narrative that the council is a roving
commission of unconstrained apparatchiks.279 The council has re-
tained a degree of discretion, but when it comes to assessing the
arbitrariness of agency actions, the council's discretion, it must
be conceded, lies in narrow and cabined areas. Moreover, it is
worth underscoring that the council's remit to impose financial
safeguards on a broad array of firms is necessary to the project of
avoiding systemic risk. We now know that the financial crisis was
exacerbated, and in some ways may have been precipitated, by
the risky activities of an unpredictable array of different nonbank
financial actors. 280 The only way to regulate finance-with its
ever-lower barriers to entry and ever-larger number of institu-
tions interested in providing it-is with flexibility, and with cred-
ible warnings. The financial sector is not just full of knowns, or
known unknowns, but also has its share of unknown unknowns,
at least from the perspective of the regulator.281 The liquidity of
277 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Update on Review of Asset Management
Products and Activities *2-4 (Apr 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/EP3E-PT3R.
278 See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 2016 Annual Report *16 (June 21,
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/8B87-SRY5 (recommending housing finance reform).
279 Unlike the National Industrial Recovery Act, which Justice Benjamin Cardozo fa-
mously describe as "delegation running riot." A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United
States, 295 US 495, 553 (1935) (Cardozo concurring).
280 See Part I.A.
281 "[Tlhere are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do
not know. But there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know."
US Department of Defense, DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb
12, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/AL4K-ZLRX.
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the American capital markets requires a vast number of partici-
pants offering a vast array of products. Perfectly identifying
which of these participants are the risky ones in advance has
never been possible in the past, and is even more unlikely today.
C. The Procedural Curbs on the Council's Discretion
The council's adoption of regulation by threat is further bol-
stered by the novel procedural protections incorporated into the
FSOC scheme. It has voting requirements, a seat at the table for
different kinds of regulators, including, almost uniquely, state
regulators, an international check not shared by many federal
agencies, along with, of course, some standard procedural protec-
tions. These checks help offset any rule-of-law concerns associ-
ated with the council's retention of flexibility in the designation
process as well as its refusal to assess quantified costs and bene-
fits in connection with individual designation decisions; we re-
view them here in turn.
The structure of the council, which includes a diverse array
of agency heads, helps. Each of the heads of the nine federal agen-
cies on the council, along with an independent member with in-
surance expertise, must vote before any designation is made. A
designation is finalized only with an affirmative vote from seven
of these FSOC members, which must include the secretary of the
treasury. 82 With the exception of the independent member, all of
these FSOC members are financial regulators, but they regulate
very different aspects of the financial system. The Fed, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, NCUA, and FDIC regulate
banks or bank-like institutions.53 The SEC and CFTC supervise
the capital markets.284 The FHFA regulates the government spon-
sored mortgage securitization giants.25 The director of the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau is charged with protecting the
282 Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a)(1), 124 Stat at 1398, 12 USC § 5323(a)(1).
283 Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Con-
tracts, 94 Cornell L Rev 1073, 1094 (2009) ("Federal banking agencies-the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC),... the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA)-regulate depository institutions.").
284 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-291, 48 Stat 881, codified as
amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq; Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
Pub L No 93-463, 88 Stat 1389, codified as amended in various sections of Title 7.
285 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 § 1311(b), Pub L No 110-289, 122 Stat
2654, 2661-62, codified at 12 USC § 4511(b).
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interests of consumers. 286 And the secretary of the treasury is a
political appointee with a vast array of diverse responsibilities.287
It is in many ways a "team of rivals," comprising agencies
that have struggled against one another for turf, and in some
cases, for budgets.2ss The SEC and CFTC have been at logger-
heads since their founding.289 Banks may choose their regulator
by choosing who issues their bank charter; moreover, they can
switch charters, and regulators, as they see fit, creating a compe-
tition of sorts between the agencies that bolster their budgets
from fees from the number of banks they supervise.290
Few of these agencies have any reason to defer to a decision
allocating supervision to the Fed. In fact, FSOC is in this way at
least a partial example of a regulatory contrarian enterprise-a
regulatory process that includes diverse opinions and even devil's
advocates in an effort to provide checks on regulation before mat-
ters come to the courts.291
There are other reasons to believe that the way the council
practices administrative law is, if different, not wrong. The coun-
cil has essentially no budget and almost no employees, which ren-
ders it unlikely to be moved by the prospect of regulatory turf-
building.292 It does not even have its own office building; its staff
is housed in the Treasury Department.293 Nor does the council su-
pervise the firms that it designates-that job is delegated to the
Fed. Its decision to require regulation therefore does not create a
regulatory program of its own that it could grow-one of the
standard stories told about regulatory waste involves this sort of
struggle for size, and there is no reason to believe that the council
286 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1011-12, 124 Stat at 1964-66, 12 USC §§ 5491-92.
287 31 USC §§ 301(b), 321.
288 For a famous use of the term, see generally Doris Kearns Goodwin, Team of Rivals:
The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln (Simon & Schuster 2005).
289 See, for example, John Manley, U.S. Market Regulators in Bid to End Turf War
(Reuters, Sept 2, 2009), archived at http://perma.ccBF89-VH26.
290 See Dain C. Donelson and David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The Office of
Thrift Supervision's Performance during the Financial Crisis, 89 NC L Rev 1777, 1781
(2011); Marcelo Rezende, The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings
*3 (Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-20, Mar 5,
2014), archived at http://perma.ccfUY5F-6ZDT.
291 Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 NC L Rev
1629, 1649 (2011).
292 See Eva Becker, Knowledge Capture in Financial Regulation: Data-, Information-
and Knowledge-Asymmetries in the U.S. Financial Crisis 108 (Springer 2016).
293 Allen, 76 Ohio St L J at 1114-15 (cited in note 102) (noting that the council has a
dedicated staff of twenty-five employees and a budget of less than $10 million).
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would engage in it.294 FSOC lacks this famous incentive to regu-
late, in other words, because there is no advantage to the council
in doing so.
Another source of FSOC's process legitimacy stems from the
political accountability of its member agencies. The chair of the
council is the secretary of the treasury, a political appointee re-
movable from his job at will, and, as such, is accountable to the
president. Moreover, the secretary of the treasury has a veto right
against designation.295 It is a role that underscores Professor
Gillian Metzger's argument that "[t]he creation of the FSOC can
be seen as part of an effort to inject more political accountability
into financial-system oversight," rather than less.296
Most of the other members of the council are independent
regulators. Although they will tend to be members of the same
political party (whichever party controls the White House), they
generally are not subject to presidential oversight. By putting
the heads of those agencies on the council, Dodd-Frank has cre-
ated a council full of presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed
voting members. This is not a particularly unique facet of agency
leadership, but by making each of the financial regulators with
voting rights subject to senate confirmation, which requires the
approval of not just the banking committee, but other commit-
tees that oversee other regulatory members, such as the agricul-
ture and commerce committees, the legislative stakeholders in
the council's enterprise are larger than they are in the case of
other agencies.
It is accordingly no surprise that designations do not look like
an obscurantist technocratic exercise. In the case of MetLife, the
council looked at practicalities as well as at the risks posed by
MetLife. It observed, for example, that MetLife's current state
regulators "have never been tested by the material financial dis-
tress of an insurance company of the size, scope, and complexity
of MetLife's insurance subsidiaries."297 When rescinding the des-
ignation of GE Capital, the council made both technocratic and
294 It is true that the council must review designated firms on an annual basis to see
if they are still systemically risky, but it is hard to see how this builds turf for the council,
as it relies on staff from its member agencies to conduct these reviews. See Nonbank Des-
ignations-FAQ (cited in note 121).
295 See text accompanying note 109.
296 Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reflection: The Evolv-
ing Relationship between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78.3 L & Con-
temp Probs 129, 146 (2015).
297 MetLife Designation at *27 (cited in note 147).
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practical findings. It observed that "GE Capital has decreased its
total assets by over 50 percent, shifted away from short-term
funding, and reduced its interconnectedness with large financial
institutions," terms of regulatory art.298 But it observed in
practical terms that these changes also meant that it was no
longer acting like a bank: "[T]he company no longer owns any U.S.
depository institutions and does not provide financing to consum-
ers or small business customers in the United States."299
Yet another source of process legitimacy stems from the
unique diversity of the council's decision-making process. State
insurance, securities, and banking commissioners play a role in
designation decisions-they are each nonvoting members, along
with the heads of the Federal Insurance Office and the Office of
Financial Research.300 This state representation adds an alterna-
tive perspective to the enterprise, a perspective that other federal
agencies cannot match; none of them include state representa-
tives in the same way.301 There are many regulatory projects that
are enterprises in which the states and the federal government
must cooperate-the Environmental Protection Agency relies on
the states to come up with local plans to deal with water and air
pollution, the Affordable Care Act30 2 relies in part on state-run ex-
changes, and so on-but these relationships do not put state reg-
ulators at the leadership table of a federal enterprise. By includ-
ing states on the council, FSOC is unique.
As Metzger has observed, it is a particular difference for fi-
nance; the "incorporation of state regulators is a departure from
the dual banking system that long dominated the nation."303 In-
stead, FSOC looks more like a coordination exercise of independ-
ent and politically accountable regulators, with limited powers to
force each other to act or vote in a particular way.
Finally, the council's designation process is part of a global
effort to identify systemically risky firms and do something about
298 Rescission of GE Determination at *2 (cited in note 17).
299 Id.
300 Who Is on the Council? (FSOC, May 10, 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/BV52-225L.
301 State officials are not placed in leadership roles in federal programs, though state
officials often enjoy powers delegated to them by Congress, a fact that has worried some
scholars who take the nondelegation doctrine particularly seriously. See, for example,
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Del-
egation, 104 Colum L Rev 2097, 2167 n 267 (2004) ("Delegations to state entities may be
permissible in circumstances in which delegations to private entities would not be.").
302 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
303 Metzger, 78.3 Law & Contemp Probs at 150 (cited in note 296).
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them. Others have criticized this international constraint as one
that removes power from the council; in our view, it acts as an
additional, and novel, constraint on the council's discretion.304
If the FSB, an international body of financial regulators, to
which America sends representatives, but at which the council
has no formal role, believes that an American financial institu-
tion is systemically risky, it can make its own designation.os The
FSB has promulgated a list of so-called G-SIBs, or globally sys-
temically important banks,306 and, intriguingly, G-SIIs, or glob-
ally systemically important insurers, of whom there are cur-
rently nine, three of which are the American insurers MetLife,
Prudential, and AIG.307
This independent designation process limits the ability of the
council to let "national champions" become systemically risky in
an effort to gain global market share or represent American in-
terests.308 Moreover, it is consistent with the purpose of interna-
tional economic law, which might be broadly characterized as
seeking to reduce regulatory barriers and facilitate trade among
them. The World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, has as
one of its "pillars" a commitment to "national treatment," or treat-
ing foreign and domestic firms the same way.3 0 9
To be sure, some have criticized the council for hewing too
closely to the designations of the FSB.31o Two of the four designa-
tions made by the council were first made by the international
entity.a3 But one would expect government bodies on the lookout
304 See Part III.
305 The FSB's methodology for identifying systemically significant insurers is de-
scribed in notes 117, 165, 173 and accompanying text.
306 See generally Financial Stability Board, 2015 Update of List of Global Systemically
Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/C9QV-XZXA.
307 See Financial Stability Board, 2015 Update of List of Global Systematically Im-
portant Insurers (G-SlIs) *3 (Nov 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/X9RB-R3JY.
308 Designation by the FSB arguably has no independent legal effect, but the members
of the board, which include American and foreign regulators, have committed themselves
to implement policies formulated by the board. G.A. Walker, International Financial In-
stability and the Financial Stability Board, 47 Intl Law 1, 29-30 (2013) ("[Tlhe legal effec-
tiveness of any of the FSB's work is expressly excluded . .. with implementation being
dealt with through member commitment."). Designation by the board as a global system-
ically important insurer would mean that board regulators outside of the United States
would be expected to subject American firms doing business to heightened supervision,
especially if FSOC's designation decision was delayed. See id at 41 (describing the inter-
action between the FSB's global priorities and institutions like FSOC).
309 See Raj Bhala, International Trade Law Handbook: Theory and Practice 423-98
(Lexis 2d ed 2001) (describing national treatment as one of four pillars of the WTO).
310 See note 4 and accompanying text.
311 See Zaring, 52 Va J Intl L at 700-01 (cited in note 39).
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for systemic risk to evaluate risk in similar ways; the correlation
between international designations and council designations is
not exact, and, of course, the council, through its members, has a
voice in the international process itself.
D. Implications for Policy
Ever since it first began to do business, the council has been
on the receiving end of criticism from the financial industry.
Congress has indicated some receptivity to these concerns.312 The
council has been threatened with legislation that would undo
much of its useful work in making the regulatory system safer.
This final Section contributes to the policy debate by explaining
why the reforms proposed for the council are unlikely to contrib-
ute to the success of its mission once the way it has been con-
structed is fully understood. Those more interested in the council
as an example of regulation by threat may be less interested in
our proposals here. It is the part of the Article for those most in-
terested in right-sizing the council. Our bottom line is that none
of the reforms that have been proposed for the council look worth
pursuing, even if other types of reforms might well be sensible.
Some recent proposals would entirely eliminate FSOC's au-
thority to designate nonbanks as systemically significant.313
There have been jurisdictional proposals. The Senate has consid-
ered increasing the asset threshold for automatic designation as
a systemically important financial institution from $50 billion to
$500 billion.314
There have been a variety of procedural reforms proposed.
Legislation introduced by the chair of the Senate Banking
Committee would permit all of the members of various agencies
that are part of the council to attend meetings (currently, it is only
the chair who may attend), along with members of congressional
oversight committees.315 Also introduced have been procedural re-
forms for nonbank designation determinations. These would re-
quire more notice and comment about designation standards and
312 See text accompanying notes 314-20.
313 See generally The Financial CHOICE Act (cited in note 10).
314 Victoria McGrane and Ryan Tracy, Sen. Shelby to Unveil Legislation Heightening
Fed Security (Wall St J, May 11, 2015), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/sen-shelby
-to-unveil-legislation-heightening-fed-scrutiny-1





more hearing rights.316 Targeted institutions would have addi-
tional opportunities to meet and confer with the council before
designation.317 The council would also have to give a targeted firm
an opportunity to file a remedial plan addressing the concerns
raised by the regulators.318 That plan could be paired with action
by the primary regulator oftthe targeted firm.319
Finally, the international constraints on the council have
been criticized. Some proposals would preclude the council and its
members from operating internationally without first going
through domestic notice and comment.320
Our objections to the most extreme of these proposals-which
would entirely eliminate FSOC's designation authority-should
be clear based on the Article's arguments to this point. But we
also believe that many-though perhaps not all-of the more
"moderate" reforms of the council's designation process are also
misguided. The net effect of these rules would make it more diffi-
cult for the council to designate nonbank firms as systemically
significant. They would represent an effort to tie the hands of the
council in advance of future designations. They also would make
those designations easier to challenge in court-more rulemaking
and procedural requirements risk ossifying the council's pro-
cesses and create tripwires that aggressive courts could police
harshly.321
Several of the proposed reforms-such as the attempt to ex-
empt from designation companies with under $500 billion in as-
sets-would further undermine FSOC's designation process by
explicitly limiting FSOC's discretion to seek out new forms of risk
in the financial system.322 To be sure, we support the council's cur-
rent presumptive Stage 1 safe harbor, which partially incorpo-
rates a $50 billion asset size measure. But this support is prem-
ised on the fact that the Stage 1 quantitative thresholds clearly
err on the side of overinclusiveness, thus providing certainty to
firms that are almost certainly too small to be systemically
significant while preserving FSOC discretion for firms that are
316 Id.
317 See id.
318 See McGrane and Tracy, Sen. Shelby to Unveil Legislation (cited in note 314).
319 See id.
320 Legislation Addressing International Insurance Standards Introduced in U.S.
Congress (Mayer Brown, Aug 7, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/LHU2-5HU3.
321 For some of these concerns, see Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossi-
fying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L J 1385, 1403-07 (1992).
322 See Part IILA.
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plausibly close to the borderline of systemic importance based on
inherently imperfect metrics such as asset size. By contrast, in-
creasing the threshold to match the actual asset levels of firms
that have been designated to date would directly undermine this
approach, offering financial firms with under $500 billion in as-
sets blank checks to take on risky activity, and increasing the risk
of a crisis-which, if it occurred, might impel the government to
somehow arrange for a bailout of these firms.
Other proposed reforms would undermine FSOC's engage-
ment with international bodies. International efforts, after all,
can constrain domestic action, as we have seen. Much of what
goes on at international institutions is a negotiation, and
American representatives must have the ability to participate in
those negotiations. Requirements that proposed international
deals on other aspects of what the council does be published in
the Federal Register is a needless layering on of notice and com-
ment on top of notice and comment. Domestic regulators must
and do bring international agreements back home for notice and
comment before implementing them-and the council has put
plenty of rules through the notice-and-comment process. 323 And
we have seen plenty of examples of cases in which domestic notice
and comment regularly changes the content of international
agreements-the Fed's two-track implementation of the second
version of the Basel capital accords is an example.324 Few negoti-
ation experts advise people to regularly make public disclosures
of their goals and how they think the negotiations are going.325
Nor does it make sense to impose nakedly burdensome open-
government requirements on the council or its members; one of
the useful lessons of the efforts to change the council's governing
legislation is that they include a very large number of transpar-
ency measures that are obviously designed to slow regulation, ra-
ther than improve it. It is a corrective to those who believe that
more sunshine is always better.326
323 See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91
Wash U L Rev 59, 80-81 (2013). See also generally Financial Stability Oversight Council:
Significant Documents (Federal Register), archived at http://perma.cc/69FW-6DXY.
324 See Zaring, 91 Wash U L Rev at 80-85 (cited in note 323).
325 Kevin R. Schock, Book Review, Getting to Yes: Remembering Roger Fisher, 5 Year-
book Arb & Mediation 422, 434 (2013) (describing the limited reasons why a negotiator
might want to disclose her bottom line).
326 See The Ayes Have It (The Economist, Apr 28, 2012), archived at
http://perma.c/QMV3-VXDZ (discussing a German political party with a transparency
"fetish" that, its rivals claim, has made its "elected representatives ... useless").
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Public-observer access for stakeholders to international
working groups and committee meetings also limits the ability of
negotiators to in fact negotiate-it risks creating the problems for
international regulators that the well-intentioned Government in
the Sunshine Act327 has created for domestic regulators like the
Securities and Exchange Commission, whose commissioners can-
not meet privately to hash out their differences.328 If, for example,
every state insurance commissioner could attend a council meet-
ing when insurance companies are being considered by designa-
tion, they would vastly outnumber anyone else in the room. It is
difficult to see how that adds value, given that a state insurance
commissioner already attends meetings of the council as a non-
voting member.329
We therefore enter the policy debates by recommending
against the legislative proposals designed to reign the council in,
because reigning is not what the council needs-it needs discre-
tion. We are not unblinking apologists for the regulatory state.
Although we defend the council's discretion in this Article, and
the way it has exercised that discretion, we do not proffer it as the
best of all possible government institutions. The fact that it is a
committee of regulators obviously reflects compromises with the
path-dependent realities of financial regulation as it existed be-
fore Dodd-Frank, rather than a perfect reimagining of those
agencies.330
As such, we do indeed think a number of reforms to FSOC
could be sensible. For instance, although there is something to be
said for the chairmanship of the secretary of the treasury-it
makes the council more politically accountable-the secretary's
role, as a politically appointed actor overseeing a technocratic ex-
ercise, does not come without costs. 331
327 Pub L No 94-409, 90 Stat 1241 (1976), codified in various sections of Title 5.
328 Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delibera-
tive Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw U L Rev 173, 230 (1997) ("The Sunshine Act's require-
ments impair the ability of agency members to deliberate, adversely affect the establish-
ment of agency agendas, and promote inefficient practices within agencies.").
329 See notes 300-03 and accompanying text (describing the role and importance of
state regulators).
330 In 2009, the Treasury Department released a report calling for a total reorganiza-
tion of the regulatory field. See generally US Department of the Treasury, Financial Reg-
ulatory Reform-a New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation
(June 17, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/QR95-HNT2. For a discussion, see generally
Cunningham and Zaring, 78 Geo Wash L Rev 39 (cited in note 167).
331 As a former comptroller of the currency recently observed, "In prior decades, Con-
gress, as a matter of public policy, had been deeply wary of giving this kind of authority to
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Moreover, all of the other voting council members are the
chairs of their commissions, which means that they have all been
appointed by the sitting president and will all be members of his
party. We could imagine a council that made room for different
sorts of voices, perhaps by including voting roles for state officials,
or a somewhat broader composition, without making every mem-
ber of every financial regulatory board a voting member of the
council. Votes that include different political perspectives may be
more likely to create better, or at least more broadly palatable,
policies, but the council as currently constituted does not offer
this sort of diversity.332 These changes, however, would affect the
structure of the council and not its decision-making process or its
discretion, both of which we defend.
CONCLUSION
The financial crisis was exacerbated by the collapse of both
banks and nonbanks. Insurance firms and money market funds
were particularly unstable and contributed at least as much to
the crisis as did problems at large deposit institutions like
Citigroup and Bank of America. Congress could have created new
regulators to supervise the prudential risks posed by some pre-
defined subset of these nonbank institutions. Instead, it chose to
authorize a group of existing regulators-the council-to pick out
the riskiest of these institutions and to subject them to more in-
tensive oversight. The point of this process was not only to super-
vise the most dangerous of the nonbanks, but to warn institutions
like them that if they engaged in systemically risky activities,
they could also be subjected to intensive oversight. We argue that
this regulatory approach is both reasonable and natural.
It is hardly surprising that such regulation by threat scares
nonbank financial firms, as well as their immediate supervisors.
a Treasury Secretary, a member of the President's Cabinet whose position is inherently
political in nature." Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory
Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger Regulatory System, 29
Yale J Reg 181, 196 (2012). See also The Volcker Alliance, Reshaping the Financial Regu-
latory System: Long Delayed, Now Crucial *30 (2015), archived at http://perma.cc/28ZD
-PST4 (proposing, among other things, that the secretary of treasury lose a vote on FSOC
to reduce the politicization of the council's work).
332 The benefits of diverse groups of policymakers, after all, are behind the require-
ment that agency boards include members from different parties. Moreover, Professors
Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles have argued that "there is more reason to trust the out-
comes of mixed panels than the outcomes of unified panels" in administrative-law cases,
whether at the agency or judicial level. Cass R. Sunstein and Thomas J. Miles, Depoliti-
cizing Administrative Law, 58 Duke L J 2193, 2230 (2009).
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But sometimes the threat of oversight induces the right amount
of caution. There is every reason to believe that a roughly appro-
priate amount of caution has been struck in the supervision of
nonbanks today. Moreover, we think that this sort of regulation
by threat could be a model for regulatory problems posed when
information is limited, error is likely, and the costs of a mistake
are high. In such contexts, regulation by threat is not only a rea-
sonable choice, but it may well be good, and perhaps the best,
policy.

